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Although international business firms proliferate, there is no in- 
ternational bankruptcy system. Instead, bankruptcy law remains 
a matter for individual states. The failure of a multinational firm 
therefore raises difficult questions of conflict and cooperation 
among national bankruptcy laws. In the discourse over the ap- 
propriate design for an international bankruptcy system, 
universalism has long held sway as the dominant idea, em- 
braced nearly universally by bankruptcy scholars. Universalism 
offers a simple and elegant blueprint for international bank- 
ruptcy. Under universalism, the bankruptcy regime of the debtor 
firm’s home country would govern worldwide, enjoying global 
reach to treat all of the debtor’s assets and claimants. 
Despite its conceptual dominance and appeal, universalism has 
yet to find vindication in any concrete policy enactments. No 
universalist arrangements exist. While recent challenges to uni- 
versalism have emerged, the current lively debate over 
universalism and rival proposals focuses almost exclusively on 
their comparative efficiencies. This article provides a new per- 
spective and a novel critique of universalism. Applying insights 
from elementary game theory and international relations theory, 
this Article shows that universalism suffers serious feasibility 
constraints: it is politically implausible and likely impossible. 
Even for states interested in establishing universalist arrange- 
ments, they will be unable to do so. They will find themselves in 
a prisoners’ dilemma with no ready solution. The Article con- 
cludes that universalism holds only dubious promise as a 




Scholars of international bankruptcy are caught in the grip of a failed 
idea: universalism. Generations of scholars have advanced the universal- 
ist mantra: i.e., that the assets and liabilities of a multinational firm in 
bankruptcy should be administered by one court applying one nation’s 
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bankruptcy laws on a worldwide basis. Until recently, this advancement 
of universalism occurred largely without challenge. Even with recent 
challenges, however, universalism dominates the debate, as scholars at- 
tempt to debunk its claimed efficiency advantages. 
This debate over universalism is misguided because, simply put, 
universalism will not work. In this article, I argue that universalism is 
politically implausible and likely impossible. No nation has adopted it, 
and it is unlikely that any will. States will be reluctant to commit to en- 
forcing the decisions of foreign courts applying foreign bankruptcy laws 
against local parties. In addition, even assuming states exist that would 
be interested in universalism, structural problems will preclude the 
achievement of workable universalist cooperation.1 I rely on elementary 
game theory and international relations theory to show that even states 
that prefer universalism will find themselves in a prisoners’ dilemma 
with no ready solution. Impediments to cooperation will afflict even bi- 
lateral universalist ambitions, with multilateral universalism all the more 
unlikely. Because the claimed superior efficiency of universalism implic- 
itly depends on its widespread adoption—if not ubiquity2—this 
implausibility of multilateral universalism is particularly damning to the 
universalist cause. Universalism should be shelved, and the terms of the 
scholarly debate should shift to more plausible goals. 
Though international firms abound, with assets, employees, and 
creditors all over the world,3 there is no international bankruptcy system. 
Instead, bankruptcy law remains a matter for individual states. The fail- 
ure of a multinational firm therefore raises difficult conflicts among 
 
 
1. Several impediments make cooperation unlikely. The universalist commitment suffers 
from crippling indeterminacy, so that even states interested in cooperating will not commit. A 
workable universalist system also depends on widespread adoption by many individual states, 
a structural requirement that makes universalist cooperation well-nigh impossible. See infra 
Part IV. 
2. See infra Part IV.D. 
3. DaimlerChrysler provides one nice example. It resulted from the merger of two auto 
makers—one German and one U.S.—that before the merger were already major players in their 
respective domestic auto industries. The combined firm maintains group headquarters in both 
Stuttgart, Germany, and Auburn  Hills,  Michigan,  and  its  common  shares  are  widely  held 
by European, U.S., and other international investors. See DaimlerChrysler, Annual Report 
2000  17.  The  company  touts   its   common   stock,   the   “DaimlerChrysler   Share,”   as 
“the world’s first truly global share.” See DaimlerChrysler Investor Relations http:// 
www.daimlerchrysler.com/investor/investor_e.htm (last visited Aug. 4, 2001). In addition to its 
German and U.S. operations, DaimlerChrysler owns a 34% stake in Mitsubishi Motors Corpora- 
tion (Japan) and a 9% stake in Hyundai Motor Company (South Korea). See DaimlerChrysler, 
Annual Report, supra at 44. As of December 31, 2000, DaimlerChrysler employed 416,501 
people worldwide, of whom 196,861 worked in Germany and 123,633 worked in the United 
States See id. at 55. 
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national bankruptcy laws,4  as well as jurisdictional conflicts among na- 
tional courts attempting to apply those laws. 
States have traditionally pursued a territorial approach. Each state 
applies its own laws with respect to the debtor’s assets and creditors 
within its own borders. The result is a piecemeal, territorial disposition 
of the firm’s assets and uncoordinated, territory-based distribution of 
value to creditors, in which each territory typically favors local creditors. 
This territorial approach has long been the bête noire of international 
bankruptcy scholars, on both efficiency and fairness grounds. One fun- 
damental purpose of bankruptcy law is to halt the destructive race of 
creditors that otherwise occurs when a firm suffers financial distress. 
Ideally, bankruptcy imposes a collective proceeding that halts individual 
creditor collection efforts and attempts to preserve whatever going con- 
cern value the firm may have, in order to benefit creditors as a group.5 
By contrast, piecemeal territorial asset disposition is inefficient; it may 
diminish the overall value of firm assets.6  Uncoordinated territory-based 
distributions to creditors also raise fairness concerns: similarly situated 
creditors of the firm should be treated equally, regardless of their loca- 
tion.7    Translating  these  bankruptcy  law  goals  into  the  international 
context, however, has been problematic. 
While various proposals for international bankruptcy reform have 
emerged, historically, scholars have almost invariably advocated a uni- 
versalist approach.8  The fundamental tenet of universalism is “one law, 
 
 
4. In addition to bankruptcy law, the conflict would include each state’s other debtor- 
creditor laws as well. 
5. See generally Frederick Tung, Confirmation and Claims Trading, 90 Nw. U. L. Rev. 
1684, 1689 (describing corporate reorganization under U.S. law) [hereinafter, Tung, Confir- 
mation and Claims Trading]; Philip R. Wood, Principles of International Insolvency 1 
(1995) (discussing general principles of insolvency). 
6. Firm A’s assets are likely to be worth more as an integrated operation across interna- 
tional borders than if the State A assets are segregated from those in State B. For instance, 
suppose the firm manufactures integrated circuits. It designs the products in State A and mass 
produces them in State B. The design and manufacturing operations are very likely worth 
more working in tandem than if they are cleaved along national boundaries and sold sepa- 
rately. Even if the firm is liquidated, an orderly liquidation will yield more value than the 
uncoordinated collection activities of individual creditors. 
7. See infra Part I. 
8. The dominance and longevity of the universalist idea is evidenced by its appearance 
in 1888 in the very first volume of the Harvard Law Review, in which Professor John Lowell 
of the Harvard Law School made the case for “a single proceeding . . . at a single place.” John 
Lowell, Conflict of Laws as Applied to Assignments of Creditors, 1 Harv. L. Rev. 259, 264 
(1888). Subsequent scholarship to the present has regularly made the case for universalism. 
See, e.g., Donald T. Trautman, Foreign Creditors in American Bankruptcy Proceedings, 29 
Harv. Int’l L.J. 49, 58 (1988); Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Choice of Avoidance Law in Global 
Insolvencies, 17 Brook. J. Int’l L. 499, 515 (1991) [hereinafter Westbrook, Choice of Avoid- 
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one court,” and in its most commonly described implementation, the 
bankruptcy regime of the debtor firm’s home country—its courts and 
laws—should govern.9 That regime should have extraterritorial reach to 
treat all of the debtor’s assets and claimants, displacing the local bank- 
ruptcy laws of other countries to the extent necessary to accomplish a 
unified administration. 
The basic premise to universalism is that national borders should not 
interfere with business restructuring. Maximizing asset value and dis- 
tributing that value among claimants are economic activities. Their 
proper conduct should not be affected by the location of particular assets 
or the territorial attributes of claimants. A unified administration under 
the home country bankruptcy regime offers predictability, efficiency, and 
fairness,10 avoiding the problems that a state-by-state piecemeal approach 
would present. 
The scholarly attraction to universalist cooperation in the 
international bankruptcy context is not an isolated phenomenon. In many 
issue areas, globalization has placed enormous strains on once domestic 
regulatory regimes, forcing governments and their regulators to adapt 
national regulation to govern international commerce.11 When cross- 




ance Law]; Jay Lawrence Westbrook, A Global Solution to Multinational Default, 98 Mich. L. 
Rev. 2276 (2000) [hereinafter Westbrook, Global Solution]. See also infra Part I.A. 
9. See, e.g., Donald T. Trautman et al., Four Models for International Bankruptcy, 41 
Am. J. Comp. L. 573 (1993); Jay Lawrence Westbrook & Donald T. Trautman, Conflict of 
Laws Issues in International Insolvencies, in Current Developments in International 
and Comparative Corporate Insolvency Law 655, 667 (Jacob S. Ziegel ed., 1994) 
(“[T]he goal in developing choice of law rules in insolvency should be to apply the home- 
country law as pervasively as possible.”); Westbrook, Choice of Avoidance Law, supra note 8, 
at 515. 
10. See infra Part I.A. 
11. In addition to bankruptcy, antitrust, securities regulation, banking law, labor law, and 
environmental regulation are other salient examples of once domestic regulatory structures 
now being pressed into international service. See Andrew T. Guzman, Is International Anti- 
trust Possible?, 73 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1501 (1998); Amir N. Licht, Games Commissions Play: 
2x2 Games of International Securities Regulation, 24 Yale J. Int’l L. 61 (1999); Enrico 
Colombatto & Jonathan R. Macey, A Public Choice Model of International Economic Coop- 
eration and the Decline of the Nation State, 18 Cardozo L. Rev. 925 (1996) (discussing 
Basle Accords and international bank capital requirements); Brian A. Langille, Competing 
Conceptions of Regulatory Competition in Debates on Trade Liberalization and Labour Stan- 
dards, in International Regulatory Competition and Coordination: Perspectives on 
Economic Regulation in Europe and the United States 479 (William Bratton et al. 
eds., 1996) [hereinafter International Regulatory Competition]; Alan V. Deardorff, 
International Conflict and Coordination in Environmental Policies, in Economic Dimensions 
in International Law: Comparative and Empirical Perspectives 248 (Jagdeep S. 
Bhandari & Alan O. Sykes eds., 1997) [hereinafter Economic Dimensions]. 
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states, these states compete with each other over the primacy of their 
regulatory structures.12 Cooperative solutions to these competitive 
tensions have been proposed in other areas besides international 
bankruptcy.13 Cooperative ideas are intuitively appealing. International 
cooperation seems intellectually elegant. It is optimistic, enlightened and 
progressive. It signals a forward-thinking, cosmopolitan, one-world 
perspective.14 By contrast, territorial competition seems provincial, 
narrow-minded, and piggish. 
Efforts at international cooperation may not always be benign, how- 
ever.15 Some may be driven by perverse motives,16 or generate perverse 
results.17 And some attempts at cooperation are simply futile. Tensions 
between idealistic cooperative inclinations and the realities of territorial 
competition have generated new thinking about international regulation. 
 
 
12. For example, scholars have debated the appropriate extraterritorial reach of U.S. se- 
curities regulation. Compare Merritt B. Fox, The Political Economy of Statutory Reach: U.S. 
Disclosure Rules in a Globalizing Market for Securities, 97 Mich. L. Rev. 696 (1998) (argu- 
ing for “issuer nationality” approach to U.S. securities disclosure—i.e., regime should apply 
only to U.S.-based issuers), with Stephen J. Choi & Andrew T. Guzman, National Laws, Inter- 
national Money: Regulation in a Global Capital Market, 65 Fordham L. Rev. 1855 (1997) 
(arguing for territorial “transaction location” approach in which U.S. securities regulation 
applies only to transactions occurring within the United States). See also Stephen J. Choi and 
Andrew T. Guzman, Portable Reciprocity: Rethinking the International Reach of Securities 
Regulation, 71 S. Cal. L. Rev. 903 (1998) [hereinafter Choi & Guzman, Portable Reciprocity] 
(proposing that issuer of securities be permitted to select the securities regulatory regime ap- 
plicable to it). 
13. See, e.g., Eleanor M. Fox, Toward World Antitrust and Market Access, 91 Am. J. 
Int’l L. 1 (1997) (arguing for integrated international antitrust regulation); Deardorff, supra 
note 11, at 248 (analyzing need for international environmental policy coordination). 
14. This abiding faith in internationalism is not new. In Utopia, even treaties are unneces- 
sary for international cooperation: 
‘What is the use of a treaty,’ they ask, ‘as though nature of herself did not suffi- 
ciently bind one man to another?’ [T]he Utopians . . . think . . . that the fellowship 
created by nature takes the place of a treaty, and that men are better and more firmly 
joined together by good will than by pacts, by spirit than by words. 
St. Thomas More, Utopia 116, 118 (Edward Surtz, S.J., ed., Yale University Press 1964) 
(1516). 
15. Machiavelli saw this aspect of international politics clearly. See Machiavelli, The 
Prince 38 (Quentin Skinner & Russell Price, eds., Cambridge University Press 1988) (1532) 
(advising against particular types of alliances). 
16. See Colombatto & Macey, supra note 11, at 926 (arguing that international coordina- 
tion among banking and securities regulators is not driven by concerns for the public interest, 
but by regulators’ desire to preserve their regulatory authority and to avoid their own obsoles- 
cence in the face of globalization). 
17. See Paul Stephan, The Futility of Unification and Harmonization of International 
Commercial Law, 39 Va. J. Int’l L. 743, 786 (1999) (asserting that widespread adoption of 
the United Nations Commission on International TradeLaw Model Insolvency Law would 
increase uncertainty, rather than reduce it). 
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Hopeful internationalism has been tempered by states’ stubborn and con- 
sistent pursuit of their own national interests. Moreover, recent scholarly 
consensus shows that competition may be beneficial in some regulatory 
contexts, while admittedly destructive in others.18 Likewise, while coop- 
eration may be appropriate for some situations, it is not an unmitigated 
blessing.19 
This clash between the cooperative impulse and the assertion of ter- 
ritorial self-interest is particularly pronounced in international 
bankruptcy. Ideal cooperation promises universal benefits,  but  states 
have enduring interests at stake in insisting on their territorial preroga- 
tives, as they have historically done.20 As a practical matter, universalist 
cooperation has not been forthcoming. “Despite the near-unanimous 
support of the academic community, policymakers have chosen not to 
adopt universalism.”21 
Rival reform proposals have recently emerged.22 These challenges to 
universalism have focused largely on its hypothetical efficiency. Even if 
universalism were adopted in the form advocated by its proponents, the 
argument goes, it would be less efficient than rival proposals.23 My con- 
cern for universalism’s political feasibility, however, precedes this 
efficiency question. The economics of universalism are irrelevant unless 
some critical mass of states are willing to commit to it. Its promised 
benefits are merely academic. Universalists and their critics disagree as 





18. See, e.g., Richard L. Revesz, Federalism and Regulation: Some Generalizations, in 
Regulatory Competition and Economic Integration 3, 24 (Daniel C. Esty & Damien 
Geradin eds., 2001) (discussing differing structures of competition in different regulatory 
areas); Colin Scott, Institutional Competition and Coordination in the Process of Telecommu- 
nications Liberalization, in International Regulatory Competition, supra note 11, at 
381 (comparing U.S. and European telecommunications regulatory policies in light of domes- 
tic constitutional and institutional arrangements). 
19. See generally Regulatory Competition and Economic Integration, supra note 
18; International Regulatory Competition, supra note 11. 
20. The history of European Union negotiations over a cross-border insolvency conven- 
tion provides one salient example. Despite the best of universalist intentions, the members 
have been unsuccessful in overcoming their individual territorialist leanings. See infra Parts 
IV.B.1. and V.B. 
21. Andrew T. Guzman, International Bankruptcy: In Defense of Universalism, 98 Mich. 
L. Rev. 2177, 2184 (2000) [hereinafter Guzman, In Defense of Universalism]. See also infra 
note 64 and accompanying text. 
22. A recent edition of the Michigan Law Review is devoted to debating the merits of 
universalism and two competing proposals: cooperative territoriality and private ordering. See 
Colloquy: International Bankruptcy, 98 Mich. L. Rev. 2177 (2000). 
23. See infra Part I.B. 
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level that a universalist system would require.24 A critical question, then, 
is how likely is universalism? 
The design of a workable system of international bankruptcy is es- 
sential given the relentless integration of the global economy. For 
example, already a third of large U.S.-based publicly traded companies 
own foreign assets.25 Soon, all large public company bankruptcies will be 
international bankruptcies.26 
An international political perspective is long overdue. The idea of 
universalism has been around for some time. The modern debate over 
universalism and rival proposals has gone a number of rounds and still 
lacks for any discussion of universalism’s political feasibility. Any notion 
that international politics may matter in the development of cooperative 
 
 
24. See Lynn M. LoPucki, The Case for Cooperative Territoriality in International Bank- 
ruptcy, 98 Mich. L. Rev. 2216, 2251 (2000) [hereinafter LoPucki, Cooperative Territoriality]; 
Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Theory and Pragmatism in Global Insolvencies: Choice of Law and 
Choice of Forum, 65 Am. Bankr. L.J. 457, 468 (1991) [hereinafter Westbrook, Theory and 
Pragmatism]. See also infra note 55 and accompanying text. 
25. See Lynn M. LoPucki, Cooperation in International Bankruptcy: A Post-Universalist 
Approach, 84 Cornell L. Rev. 696, 724 (1999) [hereinafter LoPucki, Cooperation in Inter- 
national Bankruptcy]. 
26. As international business firms proliferate, the focus on international bankruptcy re- 
form has also intensified. 
Insolvency law rarely attracts much more than a fleeting interest and ranks low on 
any government’s reform agenda. The commercial community, though sometimes 
aroused, is also largely disinterested in the subject. Legal and other scholars rarely 
concern themselves with insolvency law issues. It is thus quite remarkable that, dur- 
ing the last decade of the last century, corporate insolvency laws and related 
practices should have assumed an unparalleled national, regional and global im- 
portance. 
Ronald Winston Harmer, Insolvency Law Reforms in the Asian and Pacific Region: Report of 
the Office of the General Counsel on TA 5795-REG: Insolvency Law Reforms, 1 Law and 
Policy Reform at the Asian Development Bank 10 (April 2000) (emphasis supplied). 
The World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the U.N. Commission on International 
Trade Law (UNCITRAL), the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD), the Asian Development Bank, and several other multilateral institutions have initi- 
ated active international and comparative bankruptcy law research agendas. See infra notes 
251–259 and accompanying text. Among national and international policymakers, as well as 
academics, international bankruptcy theory has become a prominent topic of discussion. The 
subject has become mainstream. See, e.g., United Nations Commission on International Trade 
Law, Working Group on Insolvency Law, Possible Future Work on Insolvency Law: Note by 
the Secretariat, at 8, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/WG.V/WP.50 (1999)[hereinafter UNCITRAL Possi- 
ble Future Work]; Board Receives Report on Russian Program; Structural Benchmarks 
Remain to Be Met, IMF Survey, Vol. 28, No. 23, Dec. 13, 1999, at 389 [hereinafter Board 
Receives Report on Russian Program]; IMF Staff, Recovery from the Asian Crisis and the 
Role of the IMF, International Monetary Fund Issues Brief, June, 2000, at 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/ib/2000/062300.htm [hereinafter Recovery from the Asian 
Crisis]. 
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norms in international bankruptcy has been conspicuously absent from 
the literature. But as Robert Rasmussen has noted, “[a]ny credible theory 
of how transnational insolvencies should be handled has to wrestle with 
the problem of comity between sovereign nations.”27 
This Article addresses the political feasibility question squarely. The 
Article provides a game-theoretic framework for analyzing impediments 
to universalist cooperation among sympathetic states. The game- 
theoretic approach to international cooperation has been a staple of mod- 
ern international relations theory, applied to many traditional 
international security and international economic issues.28 Applications 
to international law, however, are fairly recent.29  The Article begins with 
a summary in Part I of the debate over universalism and its claimed effi- 
ciencies. Part II suggests some intuitive reasons why states will be 
reluctant to adopt universalism. Parts III and IV describe an even deeper 
problem for universalism, arguing that even states interested in 
universalist cooperation will have difficulty achieving it. Part III sets out 
the universalist dilemma. Part IV describes the conditions of play in the 
international bankruptcy game, showing their inhospitality  to 
cooperation and the gloomy prospects for universalism. Part V contrasts 
the universalist dilemma with international cooperation that occurs in 
other contexts. It describes the role that international regimes and 
institutions play in overcoming impediments to cooperation, while 
expressing doubt that institutional solutions exist for universalism. 
 
I. Debating Universalism 
 
Territoriality simply honors the age-old behavior of nations in 
exercising jurisdiction over assets and parties within their borders. 





27. Robert K. Rasmussen, Resolving Transnational Insolvencies Through Private Order- 
ing, 98 Mich. L. Rev. 2252, 2255 (2000) [hereinafter Rasmussen, Private Ordering]. 
All the participants in the debate over transnational insolvencies claim that their approach 
is the most (economically) efficient. Indeed, to date, this is the primary claim of both the uni- 
versalist and bankruptcy selection clause approaches, both of which have yet to even assert 
that they respect the noneconomic decisions reflected in domestic bankruptcy law. Id. at 2256. 
28. See infra note 83 and accompanying text. 
29. See Ronald A. Cass, Introduction: Economics and International Law, in Economic 
Dimensions, supra note 11, at 1, 27 (“Until recently, there has been little game theoretic 
analysis of international law issues, although game theory long has recognized nations as 
strategic actors.”). 





10 Michigan Journal of International Law [Vol. 23:1 
 
practice.30 Each nation in which a multinational debtor owns assets 
decides under its own laws how the assets within its territory should be 
treated in the face of creditor claims. For example, assume that Firm A 
has assets, employees, and creditors in both State A and State B. When it 
suffers financial distress, it files for bankruptcy in State A, where its 
headquarters are located. This will protect the firm’s assets in State A, 
but under the territorial system that currently dominates,31 the filing will 
have no effect on the firm’s assets in State B. Creditors may still pursue 
the firm’s State B assets, relying on State B law.32 The firm might 
additionally file for bankruptcy in State B, but that proceeding would 
occur under State B law administered by State B courts. 
Historically, analysts have also agreed that a universalist approach is 
preferable to one segmented by territorial boundaries. The financial dis- 
tress of a multinational firm should come under one bankruptcy regime, 
even though several states may claim jurisdiction over various pieces of 
the firm or over claimants located in or having some other connection 
with those states. 
This Part first explains the case for universalism, and then discusses 
rival proposals that have recently emerged. 
 
A. The Universalist Account 
The basic universalist principle is “one law, one court.”33 As most 
commonly envisioned by universalists, the courts of the debtor’s home 
 
 
30. See LoPucki, Cooperative Territoriality, supra note 24, at 2220; Lucian Arye 
Bebchuk & Andrew T. Guzman, An Economic Analysis of Transnational Bankruptcies, 42 J. 
L. & Econ. 775, 787 (1999) (surveying laws of various jurisdictions and concluding that “the 
dominant approach to transnational bankruptcies remains territorial”); Westbrook, Theory and 
Pragmatism, supra note 24, at 460. 
31. For a discussion of the few insolvency treaties that do exist, see Frederick Tung, Fear 
of Commitment in International Bankruptcy, 33 Geo. Wash. Int’l L. Rev. 555, 565 & n.42 
(2001) [hereinafter Tung, Fear of Commitment]. 
32. The courts of State A might attempt to inhibit creditor collection activity against the 
firm in State B, but the success of these efforts depends on the State A court’s ability to en- 
force its orders against particular creditors operating outside State A. See In re McLean Indus., 
Inc., 76 B.R. 291 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1987); 68 B.R. 690 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986) (illustrating 
U.S. court’s attempt to enforce automatic stay against offshore collection activity). 
33. Universalism comes in several flavors, at varying levels of abstraction. See West- 
brook, Choice of Avoidance Law, supra note 8, at 514–18. See also LoPucki, Cooperation in 
International Bankruptcy, supra note 25, at 704–32 (separately discussing “pure” and modi- 
fied universalism). 
At its most fanciful, universalism is imagined as a sort of one-world government system. 
International bankruptcies would be governed by one international bankruptcy law adminis- 
tered by a unified system of international bankruptcy courts, thereby avoiding the messiness of 
any local influence. See Westbrook, Global Solution, supra note 8, at 2292. In a related con- 




Fall 2001] Is International Bankruptcy Possible? 11 
 
country, applying home country bankruptcy law, would have worldwide 
jurisdiction over the debtor’s bankruptcy. In Firm A’s bankruptcy, State A 
would probably be the home country,34 and State A bankruptcy law 
would govern Firm A’s bankruptcy worldwide. State A courts would en- 
joy global jurisdiction to administer State A bankruptcy law with respect 
to the debtor’s assets and creditors everywhere, with other states defer- 
ring to State A courts. The home country courts would depend on local 
courts in other states to carry out home country decisions.35 
Conceptually, universalism is attractive. A unified proceeding en- 
ables one court to administer the entirety of the debtor’s assets. This 
maximizes the value that can be preserved for creditors by facilitating a 
coordinated disposition of the debtor’s assets.36 It assures creditors’ equal 
treatment,37 and it avoids the duplicative administrative costs that multi- 
ple proceedings would entail.38 Standardizing home country law as the 
governing law promotes predictability, thereby lowering the costs of 
credit and facilitating economic activity.39 Universalists generally agree 
that the home country should ordinarily be determined by the location of 
the debtor’s principal place of business.40 They claim that this approach 
should be straightforward in most cases, and that judges should be able 
to handle the rare controversy that might arise. 
Professor Jay Westbrook has been the leading advocate for 
universalism. Recent scholarship by Professors Lucian Bebchuk and 




text, Professor Kal Raustiala has commented: “One central lesson to emerge from the history 
of public international law is that international adjudication barely exists and rarely works.” 
Kal Raustiala, Sovereignty and Multilateralism, 1 Chi. J. Int’l L. 401, 408 (2000). Even 
universalists admit that the proposed one-world system is implausible. See Westbrook, Global 
Solution, supra note 8, at 2294. 
34. Universalist advocates typically propose principal place of business as the proper de- 
terminant of the debtor’s home country. See infra note 40 and accompanying text. 
35. “[U]niversality has been commonly defined in terms of a primary proceeding in a 
debtor’s ‘home’ or domiciliary country, with ‘ancillary’ proceedings in other jurisdictions 
where the presence of assets or other matters require local assistance to the primary court.” 
Westbrook, Choice of Avoidance Law, supra note 8, at 515. See also supra note 9 and accom- 
panying text. 
36. See Westbrook, Theory and Pragmatism, supra note 24, at 465. 
37. Some creditors are typically more equal than others, however. See Westbrook, Choice 
of Avoidance Law, supra note 8, at 508 (explaining role of priority rules in favoring some 
classes of creditors over others). 
38. See id., at 515; J.H. Dalhuisen, 1 Dalhuisen on International Insolvency and 
Bankruptcy pt. 3, § 2.03[3], p. 3-186 (1986). 
39. See Westbrook, Theory and Pragmatism, supra note 24, at 469. 
40. See Westbrook, Global Solution, supra note 8, at 2316; Guzman, In Defense of Uni- 
versalism, supra note 21, at 2207. 
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universalism. Bebchuk and Guzman argue that to the extent territoriality 
is synonymous with discrimination against foreign creditors, it creates 
inefficient investment incentives for debtors that would not plague a 
universalist system.41 In a later piece, Guzman asserts that greater 
predictability and lower information costs under universalism would 
lower the costs of credit.42 Territoriality forces creditors continually to 
monitor the location of the debtor’s assets and to ascertain the laws of 
the various jurisdictions to which assets might possibly be moved. 
Universalism, by contrast, makes asset location irrelevant, relieving 
creditors of such burdens.43 
While universalist advocates have not focused much attention on the 
question of how universalism might emerge, their brief comments sug- 
gest that universalism could evolve spontaneously through unilateral 
reciprocity policies of individual states. By those lights, any state inter- 
ested in universalism could unilaterally proclaim its willingness to 
behave as a universalist toward any other state willing to adopt the same 
reciprocity policy.44 In this way, universalist states would reveal them- 
selves, presumably allowing emergence of a universalist system over 
time. 
 
B. Rival Proposals 
Professors Lynn LoPucki and Robert Rasmussen have each ques- 
tioned the claimed efficiency advantages of universalism, and each has 
proposed a reform alternative. 
In two recent articles, LoPucki has called for cooperation on a terri- 
torial basis.45 Rather than overthrowing the existing territory-based order, 
LoPucki would build on it. Under his system of cooperative territoriality, 
 
 
41. See Bebchuk & Guzman, supra note 30. 
42. Guzman, In Defense of Universalism, supra note 21, at 2198. 
43. See id. at 2199. Guzman also identifies various distortions in certain lending markets 
that result from universalism and territoriality. See id. at 2190, 2202. 
44. Jay Westbrook has proposed “common unilateralism,” a sort of unilateral universal- 
ism without treaties that would promote a culture of rough reciprocity among states. This 
reciprocity would be facilitated by domestic institutions that would certify to their respective 
judiciaries the various other states that qualify for deference based on rough similarity of their 
laws and their reciprocity behavior. See Westbrook, Theory and Pragmatism, supra note 24, at 
488. See also Bebchuk & Guzman, supra note 30, at 804–06 (suggesting unilateral policy of 
reciprocity). Westbrook has also mentioned the possibility of other more structured devices to 
accomplish universalism, including piggybacking on the GATT or bilateral investment trea- 
ties. See Westbrook, Global Solution, supra note 8, at 2296. I discuss universalism and 
international institutions infra Part V. 
45. See LoPucki, Cooperation in International Bankruptcy, supra note 25; LoPucki, Co- 
operative Territoriality, supra note 24. 
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each state would continue to exercise jurisdiction over, and apply its own 
laws to, the debtor’s assets within its territory. Parallel bankruptcy pro- 
ceedings could occur in each state with debtor assets, and cooperation 
would occur through the interaction of agents appointed by each state to 
represent the bankruptcy estate located there.46 States would negotiate 
cooperative asset disposition on a case-by-case basis. Particular ineffi- 
ciencies from territoriality could be remedied through specific 
international arrangements, without attempting to impose an entirely 
new regime on recalcitrant sovereigns.47 
Comparing the benefits of this system to universalism, LoPucki ar- 
gues that universalism cannot deliver on its promise of ex ante 
predictability or lower borrowing costs because the “home country” con- 
cept is indeterminate48 and may be manipulated by debtors.49 
Furthermore, the interface between local nonbankruptcy law and univer- 
salist—foreign bankruptcy law would cause difficulties. The scope of 
bankruptcy jurisdiction ceded to a universalist court would always be 
open to question, and the dramatic shift from local nonbankruptcy enti- 
tlements to universalist bankruptcy entitlements would invite wasteful 
gamesmanship by debtors and creditors.50 These interface issues  are 
much more manageable under a territorial system.51 
For his part, Robert Rasmussen has advocated a “debtor’s choice” 
approach, under which each debtor’s corporate charter would specify a 
choice of national bankruptcy law that would apply in case of financial 
distress.52 The impetus to this approach is that the universalist choice of 





46. See LoPucki, Cooperative Territoriality, supra note 24, at 2219–20. These estate rep- 
resentatives could agree or not, presumably negotiating the fate of the debtor’s assets in the 
shadow of the separate territorial outcomes that would occur absent cooperation. See id. 
47. See LoPucki, Cooperation in International Bankruptcy, supra note 25, at 761. 
48. See LoPucki, Cooperative Territoriality, supra note 24at 2226. Problems with corpo- 
rate groups may be especially intractable. See id. at 2229. 
49. See id. at 2230. Universalists assert that determination of the home country will not 
be difficult in most cases. See infra note 145. However, various standards—principal place of 
business, state of incorporation, headquarters, center of main interests—have been used, with 
no single standard having emerged. See LoPucki, Cooperation in International Bankruptcy, 
supra note 25, at 713–16 (discussing various tests). 
50. See LoPucki, Cooperation in International Bankruptcy, supra note 25, at 726–27. See 
also discussion infra Part IV.A. 
51. See LoPucki, Cooperative Territoriality, supra note 24, at 2237. 
52. See Robert K. Rasmussen, A New Approach to Transnational Insolvencies, 19 Mich. 
J. Int’l L. 1 (1997) [hereinafter Rasmussen, A New Approach]. See also Rasmussen, Private 
Ordering, supra note 27. 
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Instead, the argument goes, private parties allowed to choose their own 
governing law would be better able to pick the optimal set of rules.53 
 
C. Is Universalism Possible? 
LoPucki seems to agree with universalists that they offer a concep- 
tually acceptable approach, and that as states’ various bankruptcy 
regimes converge as a result of the globalization of business, universal- 
ism might emerge. However, LoPucki and Westbrook disagree about 
how realistic is the hope for universalism. Westbrook seems to believe 
that even piecemeal and sporadic deference to foreign insolvency pro- 
ceedings is appropriate—despite the unpredictability and injustices 
generated—as it moves us in the right direction toward universalism.54 
By contrast, LoPucki notes that harmonization sufficient to make uni- 
versalism widely acceptable might take decades or even centuries. The 
crucial question is “what to do while we are waiting for the ‘new world 
society’—essentially, a world government—to arrive?”55 
I argue that the wait will be a long one. I agree with LoPucki’s con- 
clusion that a new and improved territoriality is the right approach to 
reform. However, I am even less optimistic than LoPucki that universal- 
ism is possible. At best, universalism is premature. At worst, it is futile. 
Without directly addressing the efficiency debate among the competing 
models, I am content to take universalists at their word, ignore universal- 
ist critics, and assume the strongest case for universalism.56 I focus 
instead on a prior question. Is universalism even possible as a political 
matter? Only regularized universalist cooperation can deliver the pre- 
dictability and promised efficiencies of universalism. I argue that such a 







53. See Rasmussen, A New Approach, supra note 52, at 5. 
54. See Westbrook, Theory and Pragmatism, supra note 24, at 471 (approving instances 
of judicial deference to foreign proceedings). I use the terms “bankruptcy” and “insolvency” 
interchangeably. 
55. LoPucki, Cooperative Territoriality, supra note 24, at 2217 (borrowing Jay West- 
brook’s phrase). 
56. See infra Part III.B. The improbability of universalism will ultimately affect the valid- 
ity of efficiency claims by its proponents, however. See infra Part IV.D. 
57. As will become clear from my discussion, this infeasibility that curses universalism 
applies with equal or greater force to Robert Rasmussen’s debtor’s choice approach. I there- 
fore focus my discussion on universalism. 
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II. The Intuitive Implausibility of Universalism 
 
States are generally reluctant to commit to universalism. In this Part, 
I provide some intuitive reasons why. The next Part provides a more 
formal game-theoretic framework to discuss this fear of commitment and 
my doubts that universalism may provide a general solution for interna- 
tional bankruptcy cooperation. 
Below I compare universalism with international recognition of civil 
judgments, in order to illustrate the radical deference to foreign law and 
foreign courts that universalism requires. I rely on existing international 
arrangements in civil judgment recognition as a rough barometer to show 
the limits of states’ cooperative inclinations with respect to conflicts of 
laws. Bankruptcy is a particularly difficult area for international har- 
monization or cooperation. As I have discussed elsewhere in detail, 
bankruptcy has drastic wholesale effects,58 and the deference to foreign 
law and courts demanded by universalism is far greater than any com- 
mitment states have been willing to make to date. The observed limits of 
nations’ willingness to commit to relatively narrow cooperation suggests 
even greater reluctance to accede to the broader cooperative arrangement 
demanded under universalism. 
A conflict of laws arises when a legal dispute involves parties, prop- 
erty, or events that implicate more than one legal system. When a 
multinational enterprise fails, various states may assert jurisdiction over 
all or part of the failing firm or certain of its legal relationships. States 
will seek to apply their own laws to those issues over which they claim 
jurisdiction. Universalism simply provides a rule to resolve the conflicts 
of laws that arise in this context. 
In the typical bankruptcy context, the debtor will enter formal bank- 
ruptcy proceedings in its home country, whose courts will apply home 
country bankruptcy laws. The home country court will attempt to include 
the debtor’s foreign assets in the proceeding, claiming extraterritorial 
jurisdiction over those assets and extending the effect of its bankruptcy 
law to those assets. However, local courts in these other states will also 
claim jurisdiction over assets within their respective territories. They will 
seek to apply their own bankruptcy or other debt collection laws to those 
assets, typically to the benefit of local creditors or other domestic inter- 
est groups.59   Conflicts arise because states generally favor their own 
 
 
58. See Tung, Fear of Commitment, supra note 31, (describing wholesale nature of bank- 
ruptcy proceedings and drastic effects of extraterritorial jurisdiction). 
59. “[M]any countries remain focused on the risk of injury to local creditors, almost to 
the preclusion of other considerations.” Jay L. Westbrook, Creating International Insolvency 
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bankruptcy regimes—especially as to firms and assets within their terri- 
torial jurisdictions—and may attempt to extend extraterritorial effects to 
include foreign assets of their domestic debtors. At the same time, states 
will scrutinize and limit the local effects of foreign proceedings. They 
will be leery of granting recognition and giving local effect to determina- 
tions of foreign bankruptcy courts.60 
Universalism resolves this conflict by requiring the local court to de- 
fer to the home country court and its bankruptcy law. Universalism 
demands that other states recognize and enforce home country court or- 
ders applying home country bankruptcy law.61 However, states have 
shown great reluctance to concede their sovereignty in favor of home 






Law, 70 Am. Bankr. L.J. 563, 571 (1996) [hereinafter Westbrook, Creating International 
Insolvency Law] (reflecting on countries’ behavior in UNCITRAL Working Group on Trans- 
national Insolvency, for which Professor Westbrook serves as co-leader of the U.S. 
delegation). The benefits might not always be easy to limit to local creditors: 
In the modern world, sophisticated multinational creditors are increasingly able to 
claim in local proceedings all over the world. Thus it is fair to say that the primary 
effect of the Grab Rule [territoriality] is to protect the primacy of local procedures 
and local law, with local creditors and sophisticated multinationals sharing signifi- 
cant practical advantages as a result. 
Westbrook, Choice of Avoidance Law, supra note 8, at 514. 
60. “[O]ne may note the dual approach in many countries: own bankruptcies are gener- 
ally favored and their effect extended abroad as far as possible, while the effects of foreign 
bankruptcies are subjected to scrutiny and curtailment.” Dalhuisen, supra note 38, at pt. 3, 
§ 2.02[3], p. 3–162. 
A bankruptcy contractarian might argue that states should be indifferent as to whose 
bankruptcy law applies, as long as the rule is clear so that debtors and creditors may properly 
price credit and otherwise plan their affairs. It is clear, though, that states are not indifferent. 
Each prefers that its regime of ex post loss distribution prevail. One plausible explanation may 
be that ex post losses from international financial distress are vivid to domestic interest 
groups, that in turn demand government intervention on their behalf. Or perhaps parochialism 
is driven by bankruptcy professionals whose economic interest lies in maximizing the size of 
the market for their local expertise. See infra note 93 and accompanying text. The ex ante 
efficiency benefits from predictable rules, on the other hand, are both more diffuse and less 
visible than the distribution of ex post losses. 
61. See Dalhuisen, supra note 38, at pt. 3, § 2.03[2], p. 3–181. Recognition of judg- 
ments becomes an issue when one state has rendered a binding decision between private 
parties, but the winning party must seek enforcement—e.g., collect against assets—outside the 
territory of the rendering state. Both the winning party and the rendering state will be inter- 
ested in seeing the judgment accorded respect in a state where the defendant’s assets may be 
found. For a thoughtful discussion of international bankruptcy theory within a conflicts 
framework, see Hannah L. Buxbaum, Rethinking International Insolvency: The Neglected 
Role of Choice-of-Law Rules and Theory, 36 Stan. J. Int’l L. 23 (2000). 
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Although international recognition of civil judgments is common 
and becoming more so,62 universalist bankruptcy recognition is basically 
nonexistent. Bankruptcy law is among the areas of law least amenable to 
international harmonization or cooperation,63 and to date, the history of 
multilateral insolvency cooperation has been marked by frustration.64 
 
A. Bankruptcy’s Wholesale Effects 
Bankruptcy by its nature is a much more drastic type of legal pro- 
ceeding than a simple civil suit between private parties. A garden variety 
civil suit settles rights with respect to a particular transaction between 
the parties, and a civil judgment is simply an order requiring the transfer 
of money between private parties. Bankruptcy, by contrast, has whole- 
sale effects. It provides for the comprehensive restructuring of a firm and 
every legal relationship between the firm and its creditors and other in- 
terested parties. Moreover, bankruptcy law is “meta-law.”65 In remaking 
the firm, bankruptcy law overrides contract-, property-, and other legal 
rights that exist outside of bankruptcy. While reordering prebankruptcy 
rights, bankruptcy typically effects a blanket prejudgment attachment of 
the debtor’s assets and a comprehensive stay of creditor collection at- 
tempts. Bankruptcy prioritizes creditor claims and scales down their 
recoveries, effectively distributing the losses from the firm’s financial 
distress over the entire body of creditors and other interested parties. In 
this process, bankruptcy effectively renders judgment with respect to all 
claims. It then executes these judgments through the bankruptcy distribu- 
tion. The firm’s operations will typically be modified as well, or even 
liquidated  piecemeal.  The  proceeding  will  affect  not  only  creditors, 
 
 
62. See Russell J. Weintraub, Commentary on the Conflict of Laws 707 (4th ed. 
2001). Foreign tax judgments are a significant exception to this trend. See id. at 706. While the 
details of states’ practices vary widely, many a state readily recognizes and enforces locally 
the civil judgments rendered by courts of other states. See Restatement (Third) of Foreign 
Relations Law, ch. 8 introductory note (1987) [hereinafter Restatement of Foreign Re- 
lations]. Numerous treaties on the subject exist. See id.; Eugene F. Scoles & Peter Hay, 
Conflict of Laws § 24.38 (2d ed. 1992). See also infra note 78. Some states unilaterally 
grant recognition without insisting on any explicit reciprocity arrangement with the rendering 
state. 
63. See Ian F. Fletcher, Commentary on Boshkoff, Some Gloomy Thoughts Concerning 
Cross-border Insolvencies, 72 Wash. U. L.Q. 943 (1994); Douglass G. Boshkoff,  Some 
Gloomy Thoughts Concerning Cross-Border Insolvencies, 72 Wash. U. L.Q. 931 (1994). 
64. See Westbrook, Creating International Insolvency Law, supra note 59, at 570 (noting 
limited success of international bankruptcy conventions); Harold S. Burman, Harmonization 
of International Bankruptcy Law: A United States Perspective, 64 Fordham L. Rev. 2543 
(1996) (discussing failed efforts at international insolvency reform). 
65. The phrase is Manfred Balz’s. See Manfred Balz, The European Union Convention 
on Insolvency Proceedings, 70 Am. Bankr. L. J. 485, 486 (1996). 
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equity holders, and employees, but also customers, suppliers, and taxing 
authorities, among others.66 
With these wholesale effects, each state’s bankruptcy regime embod- 
ies its own myriad social policies. Each state has its favored creditors, 
whose recoveries take priority over the general body of creditors.67 More 
generally, states take differing approaches to resolving corporate finan- 
cial distress and may have divergent views concerning the appropriate 
goals and methods for a bankruptcy system.68 Each state naturally prefers 
its own set of policy choices to those of other states. Especially with the 
bankruptcy of a multinational firm, which is likely to involve assets and 
liabilities of significant value, states may feel a significant stake in hav- 
ing their own laws apply, especially within their borders. A multinational 
bankruptcy is likely to have widespread effects in the states in which the 
firm does business or owns property. Because of these drastic effects and 
significant social policy implications, states may understandably be re- 
luctant to defer to foreign bankruptcy regimes.69 Each state will be 
disinclined to recognize and give local effect to edicts of foreign courts 
applying foreign bankruptcy law.70 
 
B. Bankruptcy Recognition and Extraterritorial Jurisdiction 
Related to the broad social policy implications of recognizing for- 





66. See Tung, Fear of Commitment, supra note 31, 565. 
67. In the United States, grain producers and United States fishermen enjoy special prior- 
ity over general creditors in certain cases. 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(5) (1994). In South Korea, 
Mexico, and France, employee priority claims are senior to secured claims. See Soogeun Oh, 
Creditor Rights in Insolvency Procedure, Insolvency Systems in Asia: An Efficiency Perspec- 
tive (OECD, Nov. 29–30, 1999), at http://www.oecd.org/daf/corporate-affairs/insolvency/in- 
asia/oh.pdf(last visited August 26, 2000) (South Korea); American Law Institute, Transna- 
tional    Insolvency   Project:    International    Statement    of    Mexican   Bankruptcy   Law 
71 (Tentative Draft Apr. 15, 1998) (Mexico); Wood, supra note 5, at 24 (France). By contrast, 
in most countries, employee claims—almost invariably unsecured—are not excepted from the 
general rule that secured claims have priority over unsecured claims with respect to the se- 
cured creditors’ collateral. See, e.g., Wood, supra note 5, at 24–25. 
68. See Wood, supra note 5, at 7 (ranking various jurisdictions as debtor- or creditor- 
friendly based on various factors). 
69. For example, in their negotiations over a cross-border insolvency convention, the 
member states of the European Union were unwilling to abandon local priority rules. See infra 
note 157 and accompanying text. The EU Insolvency Regulation that ultimately emerged 
preserved territorial prerogatives to a great extent. See infra Part IV.B.1. 
70. See Dalhuisen, supra note 38, pt. 3, § 2.03[2] p. 3–181. For further discussion of 
states’ preference for their own law, see infra Part III.A. 
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jurisdiction.71 While states vary in their requirements for recognition of 
civil judgments, each invariably requires that the rendering court have 
jurisdiction over the defendant-judgment debtor.72 The defendant- 
judgment debtor must have some sufficient connection with the forum 
state to justify the court’s exercise of judicial power over her. In light of 
this basic jurisdictional requirement, universalism represents a fairly 
bold demand for foreign recognition. It asserts an aggressive jurisdic- 
tional reach that has no parallel outside the bankruptcy context. 
Assertion of expanded judicial jurisdiction enables a state’s courts to 
export social policy to other states.73 The jurisdictional test for recogni- 
tion of foreign judgments can be understood as a mechanism to deter 
such ambitions.74 Given the meta-law nature of bankruptcy, the potential 
for export of social policy is great when a state asserts extraterritorial 
bankruptcy jurisdiction. Potential importing states, understandably vigi- 
lant about such large scale imports, may reject universalism on that 
basis. 
To the extent local creditors’ rights are adversely affected by a for- 
eign bankruptcy proceeding, their position is analogous to that of a 
defendant-judgment debtor in ordinary civil litigation. Local creditors 
 
 
71. In the U.S. lexicon, the issue is referred to as “personal jurisdiction.” In other sys- 
tems, it is often dubbed “jurisdiction to adjudicate.” 
72. See Restatement of Foreign Relations, supra note 62. See also Arthur T. von 
Mehren & Donald T. Trautman, The Law of Multistate Problems 836 (1965) (“In 
Anglo-American law . . . recognition of foreign judgments turns basically on the question 
whether in the view of the recognizing court the rendering court had adjudicatory jurisdiction 
in the international sense.”); Scoles & Hay, supra note 62, at 1011; Dalhuisen, supra note 
38, at pt. 3, § 1.06[1], p. 3-70.2. 
73. See LoPucki, Cooperation in International Bankruptcy, supra note 25, at 759. The 
export of social policy occurs when the rendering court applies its own laws to the dispute at 
issue, as occurs under universalism. By choosing its own substantive law, the rendering court 
asserts the prescriptive or legislative jurisdiction of its state. The court then exports its state’s 
social policy through its expansive approach to judicial jurisdiction. See William S. Dodge, 
Antitrust and the Draft Hague Judgments Convention, 32 L. & Pol’y Int’l Bus. 363, 365–66 
(2001). 
74. See Michael Whincop, The Recognition Scene: Game Theoretic Issues in the Recog- 
nition of Foreign Judgments, 23 Melb. U. L. Rev. 416, 425 (1999); Dalhuisen, supra note 
38, pt. 3, § 1.02[1], p. 3–9. Efforts to expand jurisdiction may also appeal to the local bar, 
which stands to gain in terms of increased representations as the scope of cases that may be 
heard locally increases. See Whincop, supra at 424. Judgment recognition conventions and 
municipal judgment recognition laws also typically allow for refusal of recognition if it would 
be incompatible with the state’s public policy. See Preliminary Draft Convention on Jurisdic- 
tion and Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, adopted by the Special 
Commission of the Hague Conference, art. 28(f), available at http://www.hcch.net/ 
e/conventions/draft36e.html (Oct. 30, 1999)[hereinafter Hague Convention]; Whincop, supra 
at 428; Scoles & Hay, supra note 62, at 1014. This basis for refusal of recognition further 
limits states’ social policy exporting ambitions. 
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would have enjoyed collection rights against the debtor’s local assets 
under local law, absent a foreign party’s invocation of foreign legal proc- 
ess—in the form of the foreign bankruptcy proceeding—to alter local 
creditors’ rights. Given that the entirety of local creditor dealings with 
the debtor may have occurred locally, the adverse intervention of a for- 
eign proceeding will trigger extraterritoriality concerns. 
















Assume the world consists of two states, State A and State B, repre- 
sented by the two contiguous squares above. The large triangle 
represents Firm B, a multinational firm whose home country is State B, 
but which also has operations in State A.75 Suppose the National Bank of 
A, a domestic bank in State A that lends only locally, has extended a 
loan to Firm B. All aspects of the transaction were conducted in State A. 
Under these conditions, absent the bank’s agreement otherwise, not only 
would disputes relating to the loan ordinarily be resolved in the courts 
and under the laws of State A, but any assertion of jurisdiction by courts 
of State B would be highly contested. That Firm B may be incorporated 
or headquartered or have its principal place of business or major opera- 
tions  in  State  B  does  not  by  itself  confer  on  State  B  courts  a 
 
 
75. The orientation of the triangle and its location relative to the State A- State B border 
are meant to suggest that Firm B’s “center of gravity”—however defined—is in State B, but 
that Firm B also has nontrivial operations in State A. See Jay Lawrence Westbrook, The Les- 
sons of Maxwell Communication, 64 Fordham L. Rev. 2531, 2538 (1996) [hereinafter 
Westbrook, Lessons of Maxwell] (discussing “center of gravity” of Maxwell bankruptcy). 
National 
Bank of A 
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jurisdictional reach that is internationally recognized.76 The transaction at 
issue has no other connection with State B. While State B might claim 
such exorbitant jurisdiction for its courts, such an approach is typically 
condemned by other states.77 Existing international conventions on juris- 
diction and recognition of judgments forbid this exercise of jurisdiction 
and forbid recognition of any judgment based on such jurisdiction.78 Yet, 
this is exactly the deference that universalism demands, not just with 
respect to specific transactions, but with respect to all the debtor’s affairs 
in State A.79 
Consider next the general financial distress of Firm B. With the 
debtor’s bankruptcy filing in State B, a universalist system would dis- 
place State A bankruptcy law with State B bankruptcy law. It would 
disempower State A courts, requiring their deference to those of State B. 
With its bankruptcy filing, the debtor would effectively drag not one but 
all State A claimants into State B, even those with no connection to State 
B whatsoever except having engaged with the debtor in a transaction 
wholly within State A. The State B court would assert jurisdiction over 
assets, parties, and legal relationships wholly within State A. Finally, 
universalism would require State A to recognize and enforce decisions 
rendered in the State B proceeding. 
In effect, the rights of State A claimants, which would ordinarily in- 
clude collection rights against debtor assets in State A adjudicated by 
State A courts under State A law, would instead under universalism be 
 
 
76. For example, the preliminary draft of the Hague Convention on Jurisdiction and For- 
eign Judgments specifically forbids “the application of a rule of jurisdiction provided for 
under the national law of a Contracting State . . . if there is no substantial connection between 
that State and the dispute,” and more particularly forbids exercise of jurisdiction based solely 
on “the domicile, habitual or temporary residence, or presence of the plaintiff” in a particular 
State. Hague Convention, supra note 74, art. 18. The concept of “habitual residence” under 
this convention is approximately the same as the home country concept under universalism. 
See id. art. 3(2). See also Catherine Kessedjian, International Jurisdiction and Foreign Judg- 
ments in Civil and Commercial Matters, 39–40, available at ftp://hcch.net/doc/jdgm_pd7.doc 
(revised translation October 1997)(noting as an exorbitant basis for jurisdiction “the domi- 
cile/habitual residence of the plaintiff”). 
77. See Kurt H. Nadelmann, Jurisdictionally Improper Fora, in Conflict of Laws: In- 
ternational and Interstate 222 (1972) (describing controversy surrounding the 
“notorious article 14 of the French Civil Code,” which bases jurisdiction on the plaintiff’s 
French nationality). 
78. See Hague Convention, supra note 74, art. 26; Convention on Jurisdiction and En- 
forcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, July 28, 1990, art. 28, 29 I.L.M. 
1413 (consolidating Brussels Convention of 1968 and the Protocol of 1971) [hereinafter Brus- 
sels & Lugano Conventions]. 
79. This is not to question that unified administration of an insolvency proceeding might 
make economic sense, see supra Part I.A, but instead to point out the drastic assertion of 
crossborder jurisdiction that this sort of approach requires. 





22 Michigan Journal of International Law [Vol. 23:1 
 
disaggregated from those local assets and subjected to foreign rules ap- 
plied by a foreign court in light of foreign claims. Again, this 
jurisdictional reach is uniquely a universalist aspiration. A similar asser- 
tion of jurisdiction made in the nonbankruptcy context—typically 
involving a proceeding of more limited scope, concerning only one or a 
few distinct transactions among a handful of private actors—would have 
little hope of foreign recognition.80 In the basic civil judgment context, 
the State B court would have no jurisdiction over the assets or creditors 
in State A that had no contact with State B. The State B judgments 
would therefore not merit recognition. The wholesale nature of bank- 
ruptcy makes wholesale recognition even less appealing.81 
Bankruptcy law’s wholesale purview means that recognition of a 
foreign proceeding effects the wholesale import of another state’s regime 
for deciding sensitive policy issues. Political judgments about local asset 
disposition and allocation of local losses from the foreign firm’s demise 
are left in the hands of a foreign court. Universalism effectively requires 
a state’s precommitment to wholesale deferral to other states’ various 
prescriptions for financial distress. This is no small request.82 
 
III. The Game Theory of International 
Bankruptcy Recognition 
 
The preceding Part explained why states will generally be reluctant 
to adopt universalism. States will be reluctant to precommit to recogniz- 
ing other states’ assertions of extraterritorial bankruptcy jurisdiction. 
This earlier discussion portends bleak prospects for universalism. 
In the remainder of this Article, I consider universalism from a dif- 
ferent perspective. Assuming for discussion purposes that states do or 
may exist that prefer universalism to territoriality, I show that such states 
will have difficulty implementing universalism. I rely on simple game 
theory to show that even under the most optimistic circumstances (for a 
 
 
80. Jurisdiction based on the nationality of the plaintiff—in the insolvency context, the 
party instigating the foreign proceeding would be the appropriate analogue—is considered 
“exorbitant.” Restatement of Foreign Relations, supra note 62, ch. 2 introductory note. 
81. See Tung, Fear of Commitment, supra note 31, at 568. 
82. Professor Westbrook suggests that these problems can be avoided by applying uni- 
versalism only to “large” multinationals. See Westbrook, Global Solution, supra note 8, at 
2298. However, if the size of the firm bears any relation to the level of its local activity, it 
would seem that a “large” firm would be at least as likely to engage in significant numbers of 
local transactions—employment and supply contracts, for example—as a smaller multina- 
tional firm. The failure of the large multinational may have significantly greater local effects 
than failure of a small one. 
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universalist), universalism is unlikely to emerge.83 Whether universalist 
deference to home country bankruptcy proceedings could be regularized 
is doubtful. And given that predictability is one of the major promises of 
universalism,84 regularity of cooperation is important to the universalist 
agenda. Universalism is probably impossible, even among sympathetic 
states. 
My analysis proceeds as follows. In this Part, I frame universalism 
as a prisoners’ dilemma and discuss prospects for solving the dilemma 
under repeat play conditions, which are typical of international commer- 
cial interaction. In particular, I discuss simple reciprocity strategies 
among states, an approach universalists seem to endorse.85 In the next 
Part, I show that given the conditions of play in international bankruptcy, 
simple reciprocity will not solve the universalist dilemma. Finally, in 
Part V, I contrast the hopelessness of the universalist dilemma with ob- 
served cooperation that occurs in other contexts. I describe the role that 
international regimes and institutions play in facilitating cooperation, 
and I consider whether such mechanisms might aid universalism. 
As prelude to this discussion, I first explain my focus on states as the 




83. Game theory analysis is standard in international relations discourse. See Kenneth A. 
Oye, Explaining Cooperation Under Anarchy: Hypotheses and Strategies, 38 World Pol. 1 
(1985); Kenneth W. Abbott, Modern International Relations Theory: A Prospectus for Interna- 
tional Lawyers, 14 Yale J. Int’l L. 335 (1989); Anne-Marie Slaughter et al., International 
Law and International Relations Theory: A New Generation of Interdisciplinary Scholarship, 
92 Am. J. Int’l L. 367 (1998); Duncan Snidal, Coordination versus Prisoners’ Dilemma: 
Implications for International Cooperation and Regimes, 79 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 923 (1985) 
[hereinafter Snidal, Coordination]; Duncan Snidal, The Game Theory of International Politics, 
38 World Pol. 25 (1985) [hereinafter Snidal, Game Theory]; Robert Axelrod & Robert O. 
Keohane, Achieving Cooperation Under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions, in Cooperation 
Under Anarchy 235 (Kenneth A. Oye ed., 1986). It has been applied in the conflict of laws 
context. See, e.g., Lea Brilmayer, Conflict of Laws 182 (2d ed. 1995) (proposing game 
models for choice of law analysis); William S. Dodge, Extraterritoriality and Conflict-of- 
Laws Theory: An Argument for Judicial Unilateralism, 39 Harv. Int’l L.J. 101, 161 (1998) 
(applying iterated prisoners’ dilemma model to choice of law); Larry Kramer, Return of the 
Renvoi, 66 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 979, 1023 (1991); Larry Kramer, Rethinking Choice of Law, 90 
Colum. L. Rev. 277, 340–343 (1990) [hereinafter Kramer, Rethinking Choice of Law]. This 
resort to game-theoretical analysis has not been without controversy. See Stewart E. Sterk, The 
Marginal Relevance of Choice of Law Theory, 142 U. Pa. L. Rev. 949, 1000 (1994) (doubting 
that game theory prescriptions for achieving cooperative outcomes apply to judges’ choice of 
law decisions); Louise Weinberg, Against Comity, 80 Geo. L.J. 53, 55–56 (1991) (questioning 
applicability of prisoners’ dilemma model to choice of law, and describing game theory and 
choice of law as “Godzilla Meets the Swamp Thing”). 
84. See, e.g., Westbrook, Choice of Avoidance Law, supra note 8, at 529 (noting that 
benefits of universalism depend on “high predictability of results and reciprocity”). 
85. See supra note 44 and accompanying text. 
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A. States’ Interests and Preferences 
Throughout my discussion, I implicitly engage certain simplifying 
assumptions concerning states’ interests and preferences. I treat each 
state as a unitary actor with well-defined interests and preferences. This 
approach is familiar to international law and international relations dis- 
course,86 and has been implicitly followed as well in the international 
bankruptcy debate.87 In particular, I have argued that each state prefers its 
own bankruptcy laws and policy choices to those of other states,88 with- 
out delving into the internal political dynamics that generate these 
preferences. 
This parochialism of states may seem unremarkable and without 
need of further internal investigation. However, public choice and inter- 
national relations theorists have cautioned us to be wary of treating states 
as black boxes or billiard balls.89 Domestic politics matters for interna- 
tional policy, and unitary actor models of state behavior run the risk of 
missing important domestic causal variables that affect international pol- 
icy.90  Therefore, while I focus primarily on state actors—an approach I 
 
 
86. See Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the 
World Political Economy 29 (1984); Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, A Theory of 
Customary International Law, 66 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1113, 1168 (1999) (defending simplifying 
assumption that national leaders identify and pursue national self-interest); Abbott, supra note 
83, at 351 (explaining simplifying assumptions to rational actor approach). 
87. See supra Part I. The focus on state interests dominates choice-of-law scholarship. 
“Most scholars now advocate, and courts now apply, some version of government interest 
analysis, which looks to the states’ legislative interests in determining the applicable law.” Erin 
A. O’Hara & Larry E. Ribstein, From Politics to Efficiency in Choice of Law, 67 U. Chi. L. 
Rev. 1151, 1169 (2000). 
88. See supra Part II.A. The general assumption that states’ favor their own laws is fairly 
standard in the conflicts of law literature. See infra notes 108 and accompanying text (discuss- 
ing states’ interests as embodied in their laws). 
89. See Robert D. Putnam, Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level 
Games, 42 Int’l Org. 427, 433–35 (1988); Double-Edged Diplomacy: International 
Bargaining and Domestic Politics (Peter B. Evans et al. eds., 1993) [hereinafter Double- 
Edged Diplomacy]; see generally, Jonathan R. Macey, Chicken Wars as Prisoners’ Dilemma: 
What’s in a Game?, 64 Notre Dame L. Rev. 447 (1989) (reviewing John C. Conybeare, 
Trade Wars: The Theory and Practice of International Commercial Rivalry (1987) 
(noting importance of public choice analysis in understanding trade policy formation)); Co- 
lombatto & Macey, supra note 11 (denying that states have preferences or interests, and 
arguing instead that only individuals have interests). See also O’Hara & Ribstein, supra note 
87, at 1169 (criticizing traditional emphasis on government interests, as opposed to individual 
interests, in U.S. conflicts scholarship and court opinions). 
90. See Snidal, Coordination, supra note 83, at 926 (acknowledging drawbacks to realist 
assumption of states as goal-seeking actors with well-defined preferences); Andrew Moravc- 
sik, Introduction: Integrating International and Domestic Theories of International 
Bargaining, in Double-Edged Diplomacy supra note 89, at 3; Keisuke Iida, When and How 
Do Domestic Constraints Matter?: Two-Level Games with Uncertainty, 37 J. Conflict Re- 
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justify below—I first comment briefly on influences of domestic actors 
and interest groups.91 
In general, a state’s preference for its own bankruptcy law and reluc- 
tance to recognize foreign bankruptcy proceedings may arise from the 
desire of domestic political actors to defend the policies implicit in their 
domestic laws. This may include the preservation of any perquisites that 
redound to particular groups under those laws. The complexities of a 
state’s bankruptcy regime reflect myriad policy decisions and political 
trade offs.92 These trade-offs might enhance the public interest or merely 
the interests of the victors in domestic rent seeking contests. Regardless 
of which, political actors will wish to preserve the balance struck in their 
domestic bankruptcy rules.93 They will generally resist recognition of 
foreign bankruptcy proceedings that would upset this careful balance.94 
This home town bias sets the stage for the conflict of bankruptcy laws 
that arises with the financial demise of a multinational firm. 
For the remainder of this Article, I continue with the traditional 
focus on state actors, assuming that their political leaders pursue national 
interests, without much further attention to domestic politics. This 
approach emphasizes external incentives and influences on states, 
highlighting   the   systemic   constraints   and   opportunities   of   the 
 
 
sol. 403, 403–04 (1993) (criticizing realist tradition of “treat[ing] nation-states as unitary 
actors” and noting that “[i]n reality, foreign policy decisions are the result of political proc- 
esses within nation-states.”). Moreover, speaking of states’ interests and states’ preferences 
may be anthropomorphic: “Institutions in general, and governments in particular, do not have 
preferences, people do. Governmental policy reflects the preferences of powerful constituents, 
not some mystically determined set of preferences that might be described as the ‘national 
interest.’ ” Colombatto & Macey, supra note 11, at 931. 
91. States’ internal political processes are heterogeneous, of course, so any account nec- 
essarily involves some generality and some speculation. 
92. See supra Part II.A. 
93. In general, interest groups with political influence sufficient to affect policy or cap- 
ture rents from the domestic legislative process will typically also have sufficient influence to 
preserve these policies or protect these same rents from potential dilution from the incursion 
of foreign or international laws. Some evidence exists to suggest that bankruptcy professionals 
exercise significant political influence in shaping a state’s bankruptcy law. See Bruce G. Car- 
ruthers & Terence C. Halliday, 74 Am. Bankr. L.J. 35, 38 (2000) (“Bankruptcy law 
historically has appeared to be a marginal or complex field of law where most citizens or 
companies have had little interest and where professional experience should count a great 
deal.”); Eric A. Posner, The Political Economy of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 96 
Mich. L. Rev. 47, 57 (1997) (describing lawyers’ roles and interests in shaping U.S. bank- 
ruptcy law reform); Stephan, supra note 17, at 787 (describing influence of technical experts 
on formulation of international bankruptcy and commercial law). Reluctance to recognize 
foreign bankruptcy proceedings might therefore arise from professionals’ desire to preserve 
their local franchise in professional services from the foreign incursion that would result from 
recognition. 
94. I discuss the possibility of jurisdiction trading below. See infra Part III.B. 
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international system.95  It makes the ensuing game analysis tractable; “it 
simplifies our premises, making deductions clearer.”96 
Given that my task is to prove a negative, these simplifying assump- 
tions only strengthen my argument. If, as I claim, states considered as 
unitary actors will be unable to achieve cooperation, consideration of 
domestic influences would only show universalism to be even more du- 
bious.97 Opening the black box of the state only reveals more actors and 
influences that might frustrate cooperative endeavors. In general, as the 
number of relevant actors rises, cooperation becomes less likely.98 Identi- 
fying the domestic actors within each state only multiplies the number of 
constituencies that must ratify, and may veto, any cooperative arrange- 
ment. “International agreement is less likely when domestic politics is 
involved. . . . It is not just anarchy but also domestic politics that makes 
cooperation difficult.”99 For the most part, I make fairly optimistic as- 
sumptions—from a universalist’s perspective—concerning states’ 
preference for universalism, in order to show its futility.100 Treating states 
as unitary actors is consistent with this “best case” approach. Considera- 
tion of internal domestic influences would only make universalism less 
likely, not more. 
To that analysis we now turn. 
 
B. Conflicting Bankruptcy Laws and the Prisoners’ Dilemma 
Even between states that might prefer universalism to territoriality, 
the states will find themselves in a prisoners’ dilemma.101 Below, I sug- 
gest a plausible account of states’ preference for universalism. Though 
states generally prefer their own bankruptcy laws, I will assume that 
states exist that identify a potential for mutual gains from universalist 




95. See Keohane, supra note 86, at 29; Abbott, supra note 83, at 351–52. 
96. Keohane, supra note 86, at 29. While two-level game analysis has been used to cap- 
ture the interaction of international relations with domestic political constraints, the efforts 
have been largely descriptive in nature. See, e.g., Double-Edged Diplomacy, supra note 89. 
97. See Helen V. Milner, Interests, Institutions, and Information: Domestic 
Politics and International Relations 80 (1997). 
98. See infra Part IV.D. 
99. Milner, supra  note 97, at  80. See also Albert Breton, Competitive Govern- 
ments: An Economic Theory of Politics and Public Finance 269 (1996) (noting that 
interests and preferences of citizens may impede government’s “freedom to tit (or to tat) when 
it is time to do so.”). 
100. See infra Part III.B. 
101. For a description of this most famous of games, see Robert Axelrod, The Evo- 
lution of Cooperation 7 (1984). 
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many states.102 For clarity of exposition, I assume away any problems 
relating to corporate groups, so that multinational enterprises are as- 
sumed to have no subsidiaries, but own their foreign assets directly.103 
1. Conflicting Preferences and Cooperative Possibilities  
Assume the world consists of our two states, A and B. Each state 
must choose an international bankruptcy policy. Its two choices are uni- 
versalism (“cooperation” in the game parlance) or territoriality 
(“defection”). As previously discussed, State A will prefer that its bank- 
ruptcy law and bankruptcy jurisdiction extend to all situations in which 
State A may have some plausible interest.104 In particular, State A will 
prefer that jurisdictional competence for its bankruptcy regime include 
the following: 
(x) bankruptcies involving State A firms,105  including the assets 
of State A firms, whether located 





102. See supra Part II. Jay Westbrook has also noted the difficulties of achieving uni- 
versalism, enumerating certain preconditions to its realization. My assumption of mutual 
cooperative gain parallels his assertion for the necessity for “critical-mass reciprocity,” basi- 
cally that enough states exist that share the perception of mutual gains from universalist 
cooperation that they will participate in reciprocal arrangements. See Westbrook, Theory and 
Pragmatism, supra note 24, at 467. He further asserts that roughly similar bankruptcy laws are 
required. See id. at 468. However, this condition may neither be necessary nor sufficient. Even 
“identical” bankruptcy laws would not necessarily cause states to be indifferent as to whose 
law and courts control particular assets. Given that (a) most states refuse to recognize the tax 
claims of other states while giving priority to their own tax claims, and (b) professional fees— 
possibly of sizable amounts—are always at stake, each state would still have some incentive to 
refuse deference and instead assert its territorial privilege. On the other hand, Westbrook is 
correct that the more similar are states’ bankruptcy laws, the smaller is the immediate cost of 
cooperation in a particular case. 
103. See supra note 48 and accompanying text. If cooperation cannot be achieved in the 
simple case, it will be even more unlikely given added complexity. See, e.g., LoPucki, Coop- 
erative Territoriality, supra note 24, at 2230 (describing easy manipulation of universalist 
home country standard in context of corporate groups). 
104. See supra Part II.A. This coincidence of choice of law and forum is consistent with 
the universalist approach, which also selects the home country court as the appropriate forum. 
Once home country law is chosen, this forum selection generally makes sense, since home 
country courts will be the most able at applying that law. See Rasmussen, A New Approach, 
supra note 52, at 33–34 (“Bankruptcy rules are notoriously complex. It is fanciful to expect a 
court to apply the bankruptcy law of a foreign country with anything approaching an accept- 
able degree of accuracy. Thus, for pragmatic reasons, a forum should generally apply its own 
bankruptcy law.”). 
105. That is, firms with home country A. 
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(ii) outside the territory of State A;106 and 
(y) all other assets located in State A that become involved in 
bankruptcy proceedings,107 regardless of their ownership, i.e., 
including assets owned by State B firms. 
State B will have similar preferences. 
Of course, it is not possible for all of both states’ preferences to be 








Firm A is a State A firm; Firm B is a State B firm. The shaded areas 
of Firm A and Firm B identify the international operations of each firm. 
It is these offshore assets that trigger international bankruptcy issues 
when a firm suffers financial distress. Competing assertions of bank- 
ruptcy jurisdiction will focus on these offshore assets. 
State A’s desire to apply its bankruptcy law to assets owned by State 
A firms but located in State B will clash with State B’s desire to have its 
bankruptcy law apply to all assets located in State B. In general, fulfill- 
ment of preference (x)(ii) of either state will require the other state’s 
 
 
106. See supra note 60 and accompanying text; Wood, supra note 5, at 240 (describing 
extraterritorial reach of various bankruptcy regimes). Under U.S. law, for example, the bank- 
ruptcy estate created upon the commencement of the proceeding includes property of the 
debtor “wherever located.” 11 U.S.C. § 541(a) (1994). 
107. I borrow Lynn LoPucki’s definition of “located” to include not only physical loca- 
tion of tangible assets, but to encompass intangible assets as to which a state is able 
unilaterally to enforce its determinations. See LoPucki, Cooperation in International Bank- 
ruptcy, supra note 25, at 743 and n.228. Under this definition, of course, an intangible asset 
could theoretically be located simultaneously in both State A and State B. I ignore that wrinkle 
for present purposes. 
 





(x)(ii)B → ∼ (y)A 
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relinquishment of its preference (y) and recognition of the first state’s 
assertion of extraterritorial bankruptcy jurisdiction. This of course is 
universalism. With territoriality, on the other hand, a state will insist on 
its preference (y) in the face of the other state’s assertion of extraterrito- 
rial jurisdiction and its preference (x)(ii). 
This sort of competition among states to advance their own laws and 
policies is not necessarily a zero-sum game. One state’s gain in having 
its laws applied to a given dispute does not necessarily diminish a com- 
peting state by the same amount.108 In many disputes, one state will have 
a greater stake in application of its own law than will other states. One 
state will more highly “value” application of its law than others. If states 
could cooperate by deferring to each other’s laws on this welfare maxi- 
mizing basis, then as a group they could make themselves better off than 
if each state blindly applied its own law whenever it could.109 
The presumptive welfare maximizing choice of law implicit in the 
universalist approach, of course, is the law of the debtor’s home country. 
Universalists have not explicitly defended home country law on this ba- 
sis,110 but for purposes of my discussion, I assume this choice is 
plausible. The home country in many cases will have the greatest interest 
in having its law govern its debtor’s bankruptcy proceeding.111 
 
 
108. For our purposes, we may assume a state “gains” when its policies are furthered by 
the application of its laws. See Brilmayer, supra note 83, at 193; Joel P. Trachtman, External- 
ities and Extraterritoriality: The Law and Economics of Prescriptive Jurisdiction, in 
Economic Dimensions, supra note 11, at 642 (analogizing prescriptive jurisdiction to prop- 
erty rights and discussing jurisdictional trade). In addition, we may assume that a state’s gains 
inure to the benefit of domestic interest groups that supported the original domestic legislative 
bargain, and therefore that such groups will support such jurisdictional trades. 
109. See Kramer, Rethinking Choice of Law, supra note 83, at 340; Brilmayer, supra 
note 83, at 197; Trachtman, supra note 108, at 645. 
110. Neither predictability nor the desire for one main forum necessarily requires appli- 
cation of home country law. Predictability only depends on a clear choice of law rule, not that 
the choice be home country law. For instance, a rule that U.S. bankruptcy law (or the bank- 
ruptcy law of any other specified jurisdiction) should apply to all crossborder bankruptcies in 
the world offers better predictability than a home country rule. On the other hand, a desire for 
one main forum may suggest that whatever forum is selected ought to apply the law it applies 
best—its own domestic law. See supra note 104. 
111. Moreover, one can imagine domestic interest group alignments that might coalesce 
around a universalist policy. Given the absence of any universalist arrangements in the world, 
scant evidence exists on this question. However, it appears that bankruptcy professionals typi- 
cally play important roles in promoting bankruptcy reform, both domestically and 
internationally. See supra note 93. Recent international bankruptcy reform efforts have been 
driven largely by reform-minded lawyers and legal academics acting primarily through “pri- 
vate” legislatures, that is, technical expert groups affiliated with professional organizations or 
selected by international organizations. See Stephan, supra note 17 (discussing private legisla- 
tures and role of technical experts in drafting UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border 
Insolvencies); Westbrook, Creating International Insolvency Law, supra note 59 (discussing 
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2. The Universalist Dilemma 
Assuming that each state values mutual cooperation more than mu- 
tual defection, these conditions produce a prisoners’ dilemma. I begin 
with a general description of the dilemma in normal form to illustrate 
states’ incentives under single-play conditions. In the next section, I con- 
sider the more realistic scenario of repeated interaction.112 
Returning to our two-state example, with two policy choices avail- 
able to each state, there are four possible combinations of their 
decisions. For each state, we can rank these four possible outcomes in 
relative order of desirability, with 4 being a state’s most favored outcome 
 
 
various reform initiatives). Consistent with this evidence, bankruptcy professionals would 
likely play a leading role in a given state’s adoption of universalism. A state’s lawyers and 
other bankruptcy professionals would presumably prefer universalism if they believed that 
they would realize a net gain in retentions and fees as compared to territoriality. 
Assuming bankruptcy professionals’ expertise remains territorially bound, local profes- 
sionals would favor universalism if they anticipated that they would be exporting their 
bankruptcy expertise more often than they would be witnessing foreign professional imports. 
That is, a state’s bankruptcy professionals would support universalism if they believed their 
home jurisdiction would be the home country more often than not. They would lose some 
revenues, of course, in those cases in which a foreign bankruptcy regime controlled. Issues 
affecting local assets and legal relationships, which would have been litigated, negotiated, and 
decided locally under a territorial regime, would instead be subject to the foreign court’s home 
country jurisdiction, where foreign professionals would reap the lion’s share of fees. On the 
other hand, local professionals would stand to gain from the cases in which their state was the 
home country. Those cases would offer local professionals the chance to export their local 
expertise as home country bankruptcy specialists, advising foreign as well as local parties as 
to how the state’s bankruptcy regime would operate. Consistent with this proposition, Lynn 
LoPucki has observed that “American bankruptcy professionals are nearly all universalists, 
because they assume the reorganizations will all come to the US so [the debtors] can be debt- 
ors in possession. Canadian bankruptcy professionals are (mostly closet) territorialists because 
they make the same assumption.” See e-mail from Prof. Lynn LoPucki, Security Pacific Bank 
Professor of Law, UCLA Law School, to author (Feb. 24, 2001) (on file with author). 
Of course, a given state’s bankruptcy professionals may not hold uniform preferences on 
the subject of universalism. Those on the losing end of universalism may not be the same as 
those on the winning end. For example, professionals accustomed to representing unsophisti- 
cated local creditors with no offshore lending activities would only stand to lose business 
under universalism. Professionals representing unsophisticated clients may also not enjoy the 
same political influence as professionals with sophisticated international firms or lenders for 
clients. Therefore, the politics of universalism may turn disproportionately on the interests of 
the elite bankruptcy professionals in each state. 
112. In the repeat play of international bankruptcy cooperation, we can think of each 
state’s separate decisions on cooperation or defection as “moves” in the prisoners’ dilemma 
game. In this context, the moves will ordinarily be sequential, rather than simultaneous: when 
State A is put to the choice of cooperation or defection, it will already have observed State B’s 
earlier strategy choices when State A was the home country requesting State B’s cooperation. 
Whether players move sequentially or simultaneously, or which player moves first in the se- 
quential game, does not affect the equilibrium of the prisoners’ dilemma game. See Jack 
Hirshleifer  &  David  Hirshleifer,  Price  Theory  and Applications  287  (6th  ed.  1998). 
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and 1 being the least favored. In State A’s best scenario—its most highly 
ranked outcome of—all its preferences are met. It chooses territoriality, 
while State B chooses universalism. Under this outcome, State B will 
defer to State A’s assertions of extraterritorial jurisdiction when a State A 
insolvency proceeding involves Firm A operations or assets in State B 
(State A’s preference (x)(ii) above), and State A will not defer to State B 
when the roles are reversed, but will apply its own law (State A’s prefer- 
ence (y) above). State A will enjoy the fruits of State B’s deference 
without having to reciprocate. In game theory parlance, State A will wish 
to defect, while having State B cooperate. 
Next best from State A’s perspective is mutual cooperation. By hy- 
pothesis, mutual cooperation is superior to mutual defection for State A, 
so State A is willing to defer when State B is the home country, provided 
State B reciprocates, i.e., State B defers when State A is the home coun- 
try. While this outcome does not satisfy all of State A’s preferences, it 
does garner State A the benefits of mutual cooperation. We give this out- 
come a ranking of 3. 
After mutual cooperation comes mutual defection, which we can 
rank at 2. And finally, State A’s worst outcome occurs when it cooperates 
but State B fails to reciprocate. In this scenario, State A defers to State 
B’s assertions of extraterritorial jurisdiction when State B is the home 
country, but State B does not accord the same deference to State A’s as- 
sertions of home country extraterritorial jurisdiction in State B. So 
neither State A’s preference (x)(ii) nor its preference (y) is satisfied. This 
outcome ranks the lowest at 1. 
State A’s rank ordering of preferred outcomes, then, is as follows: 
 
4  State A defects (chooses territoriality); 
State B cooperates (chooses universalism). 
3 State A cooperates; State B also cooperates. 
2 State A defects; State B also defects. 




113. I do not claim that these preferences and payoffs hold for all states. If anything, 
many states’ preferences are likely to be more rivalrous than those found in the prisoners’ 
dilemma. Symmetric or asymmetric deadlock may apply, making universalist cooperation 
even more hopeless. See Oye, supra note 83, at 7 (“When you hear hoof beats, think horse 
before you think zebra. . . . When you observe conflict, think Deadlock—the absence of mu- 
tual interest—before puzzling over why a mutual interest was not realized.” (internal 
quotations omitted)); Abbott, supra note 83, at 357 (describing deadlock games). 
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Assuming State B has similar preferences, their respective prefer- 
















Several features of their interaction are noteworthy. State A’s best 
outcome also represents State B’s worst outcome, since State B has gar- 
nered the costs but not the benefits of interacting with State A. This 
explains the (4, 1) rankings in the southwest box of Figure 3. Because 
the two states’ preferences are symmetrical, when their policy choices 




For example, besides states’ general concerns regarding recognition described supra Part 
II, particular asymmetries among states may make universalism especially unappealing to 
some states. Less developed countries (LDCs), which typically import far more direct invest- 
ment than they export, would see little benefit from universalism. LDCs would find 
themselves far more often deferring to industrial country bankruptcy regimes, rather than 
seeing their own domestic regimes applied extraterritorially. Since far more multinational 
firms are headquartered in industrial countries, those countries—and not LDCs—would more 
often be the home country for multinational bankruptcies. See Tung, Fear of Commitment, 
supra note 31, at 576–77. Some states may also find themselves consistently “asset-heavy.” 
Multinational debtors’ assets will be disproportionately distributed across jurisdictions relative 
to the amounts of local creditors’ claims in each jurisdiction. Some states may find themselves 
consistently in relative surplus. Such states may therefore prefer territoriality since that maxi- 
mizes the amount of assets subject to distribution under the local regime. See Tung, Fear of 
Commitment, supra note 31, at 577. Transfer payments or issue linkage might be helpful in 
persuading these territorialist regimes to adopt universalism, but there appears to be no politi- 
cal impetus to pursuing such approaches, and universalists have not advocated them. See infra 
Part V.B. 
In any event, the prisoners’ dilemma model seems appropriate among countries with sig- 
nificant commercial relations and for whom mutual advantage from universalist cooperation 
would seem to exist. Moreover, universalist advocates implicitly assume these preferences in 
their advocacy. See infra note 118. 
114. State A’s ranking of each outcome is the first number of the pair, while State B’s 
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well, giving us the (1, 4) outcome in the northeast box.115 In addition, as 
discussed above, both states are better off if they both cooperate— 
garnering the (3, 3) result in the northwest box—than if neither do. Mu- 
tual defection leaves them the (2, 2) result in the southeast box.116 
Each state prefers mutual universalist cooperation to mutual territo- 
riality, but they have a problem. They will not achieve mutual 
cooperation. Instead, they will each choose to defect, even though they 
both know this to be a suboptimal outcome. This is the prisoners’ di- 
lemma. Consider the possible scenarios from State A’s perspective. With 
no ability to assure State B’s cooperation (an issue I discuss below) State 
A is always better off defecting. If State B cooperates, then State A ob- 
tains its best payoff by defecting. If State B instead defects, State A is 
also better off defecting. Otherwise, State A ends up with the “sucker’s 
payoff,” its worst result in the game. State B is in a similar predicament 
and must also defect. For both states, defection is the dominant strat- 
egy—each state’s best strategy no matter what choice the other state 
makes.117 The dilemma is that individually rational strategy choices of 
the two states result in mutual defection, which for both states is an infe- 
rior outcome compared to mutual cooperation.118 
In the international context, the dilemma arises because states’ 
promises may not be credible. Among sovereign states, no ultimate 
international   authority   exists   to   enforce   states’   promises.   No 
 
 
115. If we represent the combination of the players’ two strategies as an ordered pair, 
with a player’s strategy as the first element and her counterpart’s as the second, then each 
player’s best outcome is DC—she defects while the other player cooperates. Conversely, each 
player’s worst outcome is CD. 
116. For each player, CC > DD. Combining this preference with those described above 
gives the overall ordering of player preferences: DC > CC > DD > CD. This is the general 
definition of the single-play prisoners’ dilemma. A further condition that CC > (DC + CD)/2 is 
required in order to assure the possibility of mutual cooperative benefits from iteration, which 
is discussed infra in Part III.C. This separate condition assures that consistent mutual coopera- 
tion returns higher payoffs than if the players merely took turns defecting. 
117. See Douglas G. Baird et al., Game Theory and the Law 11 (1994) (explain- 
ing dominant strategy). 
118. That is, DD is not Pareto-efficient. Consistent with this account, universalist advo- 
cates, bemoaning the failure of international efforts at cooperation, promise mutual benefits if 
only states could forswear pursuit of short-term parochial interests in particular cases. Univer- 
salists seem to recognize that not all states are ready for cooperation. See supra note 102 and 
accompanying text. However, for those that stand to benefit from mutual cooperation, a pris- 
oners’ dilemma exists that can hopefully be overcome. See Westbrook, Theory and 
Pragmatism, supra note 24, at 466; Westbrook, Choice of Avoidance Law, supra note 8, at 518 
(describing cooperative benefits); Lore Unt, International Relations and International Insol- 
vency Cooperation: Liberalism, Institutionalism, and Transnational Legal Dialogue, 28 Law 
& Pol’y Int’l Bus. 1037, 1046 (1997). See also Stephan, supra note 17, at 785 (viewing 
international insolvency as “a classic collective action problem”). 
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supranational sovereign exists to force states to abide by their 
commitments. Without such a central authority, states cannot guarantee 
future performance of their promises. “Nations dwell in perpetual 
anarchy, for no central authority imposes limits on the pursuit of 
sovereign interests.”119 Even if mutual cooperation is preferable to mutual 
defection, states will have difficulty making credible their promises to 
cooperate. 
One might suppose that a treaty provides a straightforward solution 
to this problem of credible commitments. Enforcement of promises can 
solve even the one-round prisoners’ dilemma. However, a treaty does not 
create its own coercive enforcement authority. It has no independent 
binding effect. That states often comply with treaty obligations does not 
necessarily suggest any binding effect. Instead, a state’s behavior consis- 
tent with its treaty obligations may show only that any benefit from 
breaching is outweighed by the possible retaliation of its treaty part- 
ners.120 As the costs and benefits associated with compliance and 
cheating vary, so does the likelihood of compliance.121 
Perhaps states could back up their universalist treaty commitments 
with domestic legislation instructing their courts as to application of the 
appropriate universalist conflicts of law rules. Domestic legislation man- 
dating judicial implementation of universalism might provide some 
assurance to treaty partners about a state’s future cooperation. Presuma- 
bly, such enabling legislation could only be changed with some 
difficulty. Its passage might therefore add credibility to a state’s univer- 
salist commitment. 
However, demonstrating precommitment to universalism in this way 




119. Oye, supra note 83, at 1. 
120. See Goldsmith & Posner, supra note 86, at 1171. 
121. This is not to assume away any reputational consequences that may attach to treaty 
violations. But these are simply additional costs in each state’s decisional calculus. Moreover, 
reputational effects are ambiguous. A reputation for honoring international commitments must 
compete with other reputational interests states might have. A reputation for helping one’s 
allies or punishing one’s enemies, or a reputation for toughness, for example, might be as or 
more useful to a state in achieving its international objectives. These various reputational in- 
terests may conflict in any given case. Reputation may also not be as critical for powerful 
states, which may be “the only game in town” with respect to particular issues or transactions. 
See Robert O. Keohane, International Relations and International Law: Two Optics, 38 Harv. 
Int’l L.J. 487, 497–98 (1997). Even assuming a reputation for honoring international com- 
mitments were paramount, negative reputational consequences depend on third parties being 
able to distinguish cooperation from defection, which will not be easy in the context of uni- 
versalism. See infra Part IV.B. 
122. See infra Part IV.A–B. 
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universalist commitment with particularity will be difficult, whether in a 
treaty or in any enabling domestic legislation. Choice of law rules are 
notoriously imprecise and indeterminate,123 as universalists admit.124 The 
universalist commitment will inevitably be expressed in terms of impre- 
cise standards, relying on the exercise of ex post judicial discretion for 
their application. But standards and ex post discretion—as opposed to 
hard-and-fast rules—do not deliver a credible commitment. Instead, they 
offer only ambiguity concerning the content of any ostensible commit- 
ment, and they invite both cheating and good faith disagreement over 
their proper implementation.125 Universalist commitments will be fuzzy. 
But fuzzy commitments implemented through judicial discretion will not 
be credible commitments, so states will be reluctant to make such com- 
mitments in the first place.126 
 
C. Repeat Play and Conditions for Cooperation 
Happily, states considering cross-border bankruptcy cooperation 
may anticipate repeat interaction with one another. In this repeat play 
context, states may have more sophisticated policy options than the 
once-and-for-all decision either to cooperate or defect. Each state may 
adopt a conditional strategy, which takes account of the other state’s past 
behavior in deciding its own moves. In this context, the prospects for 
reaching cooperative outcomes under the prisoners’ dilemma improve 
considerably.127    Each  player  has  the  ability  to  reward  or  punish  the 
 
 
123. See Whincop, supra note 74, at 427–28 (identifying indeterminacy of choice of law 
rules as reason for absence of choice of law requirement for judgment recognition). 
124. See infra note 149 and accompanying text. 
125. Whincop, supra note 74, at 433. As Whincop suggests: 
[W]here jurisdiction is defined by standards rather than rules, no credible commit- 
ment is made because the content of the standard is only ascertained at the time that 
the standard is applied to the case. That is inherent in the definition of a standard. 
Since no commitment has been made other than to apply a standard, courts will 
have an opportunity to cheat when cases arise, especially when the matters on 
which a court purports to base its judgment . . . are difficult for other states to ob- 
serve or verify. 
Id. See generally Alan Schwartz, Relational Contracts in the Courts: An Analysis of Incom- 
plete Agreements and Judicial Strategies, 21 J. Legal Stud. 271, 279–80 (1992) (discussing 
difficulties of contracting conditioned on information that is unobservable or unverifiable). 
126. “[P]arties will not contract on the basis of unverifiable terms. This should apply 
equally to conventions.” Michael J. Whincop & Mary Keyes, Policy and Pragmatism in 
the Conflict of Laws 159 (2000). This may in part explain why universalism has nowhere 
been implemented, despite its attraction to commentators. 
127. See Oye, supra note 83; Axelrod & Keohane, supra note 83, at 235. See generally 
Axelrod, supra note 101 (describing experiments confirming evolution of cooperation with 
repeat-play prisoners’ dilemma games). 
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other—augment or reduce the other’s payoff—by cooperating or defect- 
ing in any given round of play.128 Each player also understands that it 
may be punished in later rounds for defection in the current round. Given 
the prospect of reward for mutual cooperation and future punishment for 
current defection, a stable pattern of reciprocal cooperation can 
emerge.129 If the game is infinitely repeated, or players do not know when 
the last round of play will occur, as is typically the case with interna- 
tional commercial relations, stable cooperation is possible.130 
 
 
One could also imagine particular rounds of the international bankruptcy game in which 
the payoffs might not correspond to the prisoners’ dilemma, but might be more conducive to 
cooperation. For instance, suppose that State U, a universalist regime, is the home country for 
Firm U’s bankruptcy, but that significant Firm U assets are located in State T, a territorial 
regime. Suppose further that in the particular case, (a) claims of State T creditors are predomi- 
nantly local employee claims, which do not enjoy priority under State T bankruptcy law, but 
would enjoy high priority under the bankruptcy laws of State U; (b) State U creditors are pri- 
marily banks, which enjoy no priority under the laws of either state; (c) there are no other 
significant creditor groups; and (d) neither state’s bankruptcy laws discriminate against for- 
eign creditors. If State T acted territorially, rejecting the jurisdiction of the State U universalist 
court and applying its own bankruptcy laws to Firm T’s local assets, it would have to distribute 
the value of those assets pro rata as among State U bank creditors and State T employee credi- 
tors. On the other hand, because State T’s employee creditors would enjoy priority in the 
universalist proceeding, relinquishing local assets to the universalist proceeding would enable 
State T’s creditors to recover against those assets before State U’s bank creditors. In that situa- 
tion, the clear benefit to State T creditors from State T’s universalist cooperation would likely 
outweigh any countervailing policy considerations that might argue for territoriality by State 
T. 
While particular cases might arise in which states’ preferences are less rivalrous than in 
the prisoners’ dilemma, they are not likely to arise regularly, as my stylized facts above sug- 
gest. 
128. In fact, each player’s payoff is affected more by the other player’s move than its 
own. Each player’s move affects its own payoff by only one ordinal ranking, but the other 
player’s move affects the first player’s payoff by two ordinal rankings. See Snidal, Coordina- 
tion, supra note 83, at 927. 
129. In Robert Axelrod’s cooperation experiments, he found that a Tit for Tat strategy 
was the overall best performing strategy in computer simulations of round-robin repeat pris- 
oners’ dilemma tournaments. With that strategy, a player starts out cooperating, and then in 
every subsequent round simply plays the strategy that the other player played in the prior 
round. So every instance of cooperation from Player B is rewarded with cooperation from 
Player A, and every defection is punished by a retaliatory defection in the next round. See 
Axelrod, supra note 101, at 31. Tit for Tat, however, performs less well in “noisy” environ- 
ments, where imperfect monitoring or other errors may undercut simple reciprocal strategies 
for cooperation. See infra note 181 and accompanying text. 
130. See Oye, supra note 83, at 13 & n.25. While backwards induction predicts that for 
finitely repeated prisoners’ dilemma games, cooperation will not evolve, see Axelrod, supra 
note 101, at 10, finite repetition is typically not an issue in international relations. See Oye, 
supra note 83, at 13 n.25. In addition, experimental evidence shows that even in the finite 
game, players cooperate up until the last few rounds. This divergence between predicted and 
observed results may be reconciled by relaxing the assumption of common knowledge of 
rationality. See  Barry Nalebuff, Prisoners’ Dilemma,  in The New Palgrave Dictionary of 
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Whether cooperation in fact emerges depends on the “shadow of the 
future,” the particular contours of the anticipated future interaction be- 
tween the players. In any given round, cooperation requires each player 
to forego its single—play dominant strategy move—defection—in the 
hope of garnering the future benefits of the other player’s cooperation. 
Therefore, the rational player will weigh the immediate benefits of cur- 
rent defection against anticipated future payoffs from current 
cooperation. In the context of universalism, a non-home country asked to 
defer to home country insolvency proceedings must decide whether im- 
mediate gains from defection—exercising territorial jurisdiction and 
applying its own laws to particular issues—outweigh the prospect of fu- 
ture cooperative payoffs—enjoying extraterritorial jurisdiction and 
application of its own bankruptcy laws beyond its borders when it later 
finds itself as the home country. 
Several factors are critical to this strategy choice and the shadow of 
the future generally. First, perceived durability of a relationship and an- 
ticipated frequency of interaction will improve a state’s willingness to 
cooperate.131 With commercial relations, states can typically anticipate 
that their relationships with other states will continue indefinitely.132 This 
perception of a long time horizon means a long future from which coop- 
erative rewards may potentially emerge. Anticipated frequent interaction 
also assures each player of regular opportunities to garner cooperative 
future payoffs or if necessary, to punish defection with swift retaliation. 
If significant cross-border direct investment exists or is anticipated be- 
tween States A and B, and investment flows are not too lopsided in one 
direction, then the two states may anticipate that the game of cross- 
border bankruptcy cooperation will have many future iterations. Each 
state anticipates that it will find itself in the position of both home coun- 
try and non-home country in the future. As the latter, it will understand 
that in any given round, its decision whether to play universalism or ter- 
ritoriality will affect its future payoffs. On the other hand, if States A and 
 
 
Economics and the Law 92 (1998). Common knowledge of rationality means that all the 
players know that all the players are rational, all the players know that all the players know 
that all the players are rational, and so on. See Roger B. Myerson, Game Theory: Analysis 
of Conflict 64 (1991). Common knowledge is a very strong informational assumption. For a 
discussion of its subtleties, see Peter H. Huang, Still Preying on Strategic Reputation Models 
of Predation, 3 Green Bag 437, 439 (2000) (reviewing John R. Lott, Jr., Are Predatory 
Commitments Credible? Who Should the Courts Believe? (1999)). 
131. See Axelrod, supra note 101, at 129. 
132. By contrast, in security affairs, a particular act of defection may be decisive in crip- 
pling or destroying another player, thereby eliminating the possibility of retaliation. See 
Axelrod & Keohane, supra note 83, at 232–33. 
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B do not anticipate significant future interaction, then the international 
bankruptcy cooperation game looks very much like a one-shot game, for 
which defection is the dominant strategy. 
Related to a state’s time horizon is its discount factor—how it values 
future payoffs as compared to immediate payoffs. Players are typically 
impatient. All other things being equal, they prefer an immediate payoff 
to an identical payoff in the future. The discount factor captures just how 
much a state discounts a future payoff as compared to an immediate 
one.133 The lower the discount factor, the less a state values the future 
payoff as compared to the immediate payoff. In the context of the pris- 
oners’ dilemma, a low discount factor spells more ready defection than 
cooperation. Cooperation demands delayed gratification, but the lower 
the discount factor, the more attractive is the immediate payoff from de- 
fection. Therefore, in order for cooperation to emerge, states must have 
sufficiently high discount factors to induce them to forego immediate 
defection payoffs in favor of future cooperative payoffs. Finally, with 
repeat play and the weighing of immediate versus future gains, payoff 
structure matters. In particular, interval levels of the various payoffs, and 
not just their rank ordering, are important to consider. For example, the 
difference between the unilateral defection payoff and the mutual coop- 
erative payoff matters.134 The smaller this is, the lower is the temptation 
to defect, since the relative gain from defection is small.135 In general, 
relatively higher cooperative payoffs136 and relatively lower defection 
payoffs137  make cooperation more likely.138 
 
 
133. The discount factor δ falls between 0 and 1. With money payoffs, if r is the prevail- 
ing interest rate, then δ = 1/ (1+r). The present value of a payoff of π dollars is equal to δπ if 
paid in the next period. See Robert Gibbons, Game Theory for Applied Economists 68 & 
n.7 (1992). Other payoffs can be similarly discounted. See James D. Morrow, Game Theory 
for Political Scientists 38 (1994). The discount factor may also incorporate the possibility 
that a game will end. The end of the game means no further prospect for future cooperative 
payoffs. So a higher probability of the game’s end generally means that a state will value im- 
mediate payoffs more highly, making defection more attractive. See Gibbons, supra, at 90. 
134. That is, DC–CC. See supra notes 115–116. 
135. See Abbott, supra note 83, at 364 (describing devices by which player reduces its 
own defection payoff in order to facilitate cooperation). 
136. Namely, CC and CD. 
137. That is, DC and DD. 
138. See Axelrod, supra note 101, at 134 n.3; Robert Jervis, Cooperation Under the 
Security Dilemma, 30 World Pol. 167, 171 (1978). The discount factor δ can be expressed in 
terms of these payoffs to specify the conditions under which reciprocal strategies will form 
cooperative equilibria. For instance, two players playing Tit for Tat strategies will reach a 
cooperative equilibrium when 
δ > max  DC − CC 
 
 CC − CD 
 
 DC − CC  . ,  
DC − DD 
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In general, then, States A and B are more likely to succeed with uni- 
versalist cooperation (a) the longer they expect their relationship to last 
and the more iterations they expect, (b) the higher their respective dis- 
count factors, and (c) the greater are cooperative payoffs relative to 
defection payoffs. In the best case, each state anticipates numerous itera- 
tions of the universalist game, and whatever short-term loss it suffers 
from deferring to the other state’s bankruptcy regime now will be more 
than offset by reciprocal deference extended by the other state in the fu- 
ture. 
 
IV. Fitting Theory to Facts: Conditions of 
Play in International Bankruptcy 
Given these conditions for cooperation, how likely is universalism?139 
In this Part, I discuss the particular conditions of play in international 
bankruptcy, showing that they will not be conducive to universalist co- 
operation. Such conditions will impede simple reciprocity strategies— 
whether unilateral or even treaty based—which universalists have en- 
dorsed.140 First, universalist commitments will be fuzzy, relying on 
standards and judicial discretion instead of clear-cut rules. Fuzzy com- 
mitments mean that states will disagree on what counts as cooperation. 
Interpretive disagreement will garble the messages conveyed and re- 
ceived via rewards and punishments. Second, judges are typically central 
to bankruptcy proceedings, but the judicial role is not conducive to im- 
plementing reciprocity strategies. Finally, once we move beyond our 
bilateral example to consider multilateral universalism, the obstacles be- 
come well-nigh insurmountable. Even if, between pairs of states, the 
shadow of the future might be sufficient to induce cooperation and other 
 
 
See Morrow, supra note 133, at 266; Axelrod, supra note 101, at 59 n.4. 
139. As a preliminary matter, it should be noted that even if State A and State B have 
long time horizons and expect frequent interaction in terms of opportunities for crossborder 
bankruptcy cooperation; even if their respective discounting of future payoffs is not too se- 
vere; and even if the payoff structure of their universalist dilemma is hospitable to 
cooperation, these conditions do not assure cooperation. Though these conditions vastly im- 
prove its prospects, cooperation is never guaranteed. Even under ideal conditions, mutual 
defection is still always a subgame-perfect equilibrium in iterated prisoners’ dilemma games. 
See Morrow, supra note 133, at 267. Two states attempting to cooperate through reciprocity 
strategies still need to coordinate on which equilibrium strategies they are playing and what 
punishment will be used to enforce cooperation. Otherwise, they may settle in to a pattern of 
repeated mutual defection. See id. at 266. In addition, as a practical matter, conditional strate- 
gies are often politically difficult to sell to domestic constituents. See Oye, supra note 83, at 
16. 
140. See supra note 44 and accompanying text. 
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obstacles could be overcome, these auspicious conditions become far 
less likely in the multilateral context. Moreover, as the number of inter- 
ested states increases, the likelihood of sufficiently favorable conditions 
across all states diminishes. 
Taken individually, no single factor necessarily rules out coopera- 
tion. In other contexts, similar obstacles have been overcome, typically 
through international regimes and institutions. In the next Part, I discuss 
the role that regimes play in addressing impediments to international 
cooperation. Though universalists have not specifically considered it, I 
discuss the possibility of a universalist regime, but find one both unlikely 
to emerge and unlikely to be able to solve the particular set of problems 
universalism raises. 
 
A. Fuzzy Commitments 
Specifying the universalist commitment with precision will be diffi- 
cult. In this section, I explain the tendency toward fuzzy universalist 
commitments, before exploring its significance in subsequent sections. 
Largely for technical reasons, defining the basic jurisdiction of the 
universalist court will necessarily involve some vagueness, leaving dis- 
cretion to judges.141 Two significant areas are particularly problematic. 
The first is the specification of rules for identifying the home country. 
The second is the problem of defining the scope of the home country 
court’s bankruptcy jurisdiction, that is, identifying the local laws or spe- 
cific issue areas that are displaced by home country bankruptcy law. 
Lynn LoPucki’s seminal challenge to universalism first raised ques- 
tions concerning the determinacy of the home country rule.142 He argued 
that the “home country” concept is not only indeterminate, but that any 
determinate rule would be susceptible to eve-of-bankruptcy manipula- 
tion—forum shopping—by debtors. He cites egregious cases of debtors 
 
 
141. Paul Stephan offers a public choice explanation for standards in international com- 
mercial law. He argues that within the international groups producing unified international 
commercial laws, such as UNCITRAL, the interaction of technical experts, who essentially 
produce the initial versions of reform proposals, with wider approving bodies, which must 
contend with interest group pressure in the process of adopting any proposal, results in the 
adoption of instruments with few rules that would impose costs on any organized group. In- 
stead, these instruments delay hard choices by leaving actual outcomes to the discretion of 
future decision makers. See Stephan, supra note 17, at 759. With respect to the UNCITRAL 
Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency, Stephan further notes that the broad discretion left to 
bankruptcy tribunals in that instrument enhances the power and prestige of insolvency profes- 
sionals. They therefore had incentive to support the Model Law despite its creation of greater 
uncertainty in international insolvency situations. See id. at 787. 
142. See LoPucki, Cooperation in International Bankruptcy, supra note 25, at 713–25. 
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moving their headquarters or divesting assets just prior to filing in order 
to facilitate access to favorable fora.143 No workable definition of “home 
country” is possible because greater determinacy begets greater manipu- 
lability.144 According to LoPucki, indeterminacy on this basic issue belies 
the claimed predictability and related efficiency advantages of universal- 
ism. 
Universalists reply that no hard-and-fast rule is necessary, since the 
controversial cases will be few. In most cases, the home country will be 
readily identifiable.145 Moreover, a “principal place of business” or “cen- 
ter of main interests” standard has worked passably in other contexts.146 
 
 
143. As LoPucki notes: 
Debtors could accomplish [forum] shops by a variety of means. The most obvious 
means would be to move the company’s headquarters to the preferred country be- 
fore filing the case. Contrary to the assertions of some universalists, moving the 
headquarters of a large company is neither difficult nor unusual. Such moves were 
made on the eves of several major domestic bankruptcies. While an international 
move theoretically might be more difficult, they are hardly unknown. For example, 
BCCI moved its headquarters from London to Abu Dhabi shortly before filing its 
bankruptcy case in Luxembourg. Dreco Energy moved its headquarters and its cen- 
ter of gravity from Canada to the United States on the eve of its bankruptcy and 
then moved it back afterwards. To do this, Dreco divested itself of its Canadian 
properties and Canadian employees before filing its bankruptcy case in Houston, 
Texas, and then it did the opposite after concluding its case. 
Id. at 722 (citations omitted). Fruit of the Loom shopped itself into a Cayman Islands bank- 
ruptcy proceeding through an eve-of-bankruptcy corporate reorganization. See LoPucki, 
Cooperative Territoriality, supra note 24, at 2231 & n.71 (describing various eve-of- 
bankruptcy strategies available to corporate groups that wish to forum shop). 
144. See LoPucki, Cooperation in International Bankruptcy, supra note 25, at 722–23; 
LoPucki, Cooperative Territoriality, supra note 24, at 2235. 
145. See Westbrook, Global Solution, supra note 8, at 2317 (“[T]he marginal cases will 
be few.”); Guzman, supra note 21, at 2207 (“[T]here is widespread agreement . . . that, in the 
vast majority of cases, the home country will be easy to identify—making the issue a minor 
question.”); Westbrook, Lessons of Maxwell, supra note 75, at 2541 (noting unusual case of 
Maxwell, in which identification of home country was debatable). See also Rasmussen, A New 
Approach, supra note 52, at 12 (“In most situations, it will be clear which country is the home 
of the debtor.”). 
146. See Westbrook, Global Solution, supra note 8, at 2316. Place of incorporation 
might be used as a proxy, but that would be subject to adjustment as the facts required. See id. 
at 2317. 
Westbrook cites the Brussels Convention as an example of a successful articulation of 
rules for adjudicatory jurisdiction. See id. However, the reference is inapt. The Brussels Con- 
vention concerns states’ obligation to recognize foreign civil judgments. It delineates 
acceptable and unacceptable bases for the rendering court’s jurisdiction over the defendant- 
judgment debtor in civil cases. In that context, the possibility of multiple bases for jurisdiction 
works no great harm. It creates no opportunities for endgame manipulation, since multiple 
bases of jurisdiction merely broaden a plaintiff’s litigation options based on the defendant’s 
activities. By contrast, indeterminacy of the home country standard under universalism does 
create opportunities for strategic behavior by debtors, since it enables debtors to manipulate 
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A “raw, unsophisticated choice” among rules is unnecessary; instead, the 
choice may be “multidimensional.”147 According to universalists, then, 
such a standard works well for most cases, and judges will presumably 
apply discretion to the few cases involving indeterminacy or possible 
debtor manipulation. Without resolving this debate as to its efficiency 
consequences, I discuss the effect of indeterminacy on states’ reciprocity 
strategies below.148 
A second area of fuzziness involves the interface between home 
country bankruptcy law and local nonbankruptcy law. Once the home 
country is determined, there is the further issue of determining the exact 
contours of the home country court’s extraterritorial reach, that is, the 
scope of local laws and local court jurisdiction that are overridden by the 
home country bankruptcy regime. Universalism selects home country 
law applied by home country courts, but only as to bankruptcy issues. 
Deciding where bankruptcy law ends and nonbankruptcy law begins, 
however, is not always an easy issue. Put differently, the scope of the 
universalist choice of law and forum selection rules is not self- 
defining.149 
These interface issues will be especially problematic in two areas: 
creditor entitlements and regulatory issues. As to the former, creditors’ 
rights in bankruptcy generally depend on their entitlements outside of 
bankruptcy. Bankruptcy law does not create the contract or property 
rights that creditors assert against the debtor in bankruptcy. Those rights 
exist independent of bankruptcy law. But deciding whether a given issue 
is a bankruptcy issue or one involving nonbankruptcy entitlements is not 
always simple. For example, when a German debtor has fraudulently 
conveyed land in Belgium to an innocent third party, it pits the debtor’s 
creditors against the innocent purchaser. Should German bankruptcy law 
applied by the German court determine who is entitled to the land? Or 




applicable bankruptcy law and the appropriate bankruptcy forum through their own endgame 
maneuvers, to the detriment of creditors. Only if the Brussels Convention conditioned jurisdic- 
tion over defendants based on plaintiff’s activities would the comparison hold. Such an 
approach to jurisdiction would, of course, be absurd. See supra Part II.B. 
147. See Westbrook, Global Solution, supra note 8, at 2317. 
148. See infra Part IV.B. 
149. Universalists recognize these problems as well. See Westbrook & Trautman, supra 
note 9, at 662 (describing difficulty of deciding where local property law ends and universalist 
bankruptcy rules should take over); See also Westbrook, Theory and Pragmatism, supra note 
24, at 462 (distinguishing choice of law from forum choice, and illustrating when intersection 
of local and home country laws may create difficult questions). 
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tion?150 In general, ownership rights in land are determined by the law 
and in the courts of the jurisdiction in which the land is located,151 which 
in our example would indicate Belgian law and courts. However, deter- 
mining entitlements to the land would also have clear distributional 
consequences for creditors, which is a fundamental bankruptcy issue. 
From this perspective, the German bankruptcy regime should govern. 
How this issue is ultimately resolved is not as important for our purposes 
as is the simple illustrative value of the example. It highlights the inevi- 
table murkiness in the content of the universalist commitment.152 
Regulatory issues may also be particularly nettlesome. To what ex- 
tent may bankruptcy law modify local regulatory obligations to which a 
debtor would otherwise be subject? For example, may local environ- 
mental clean-up obligations be superseded by home country rescue 
rules? May the universalist bankruptcy court relieve the debtor from such 
regulatory obligations in a non-home country? Resolution of these issues 
within a single national jurisdiction may not be straightforward.153 Reso- 
lution across jurisdictions is likely to be quite messy and 
unpredictable.154 Consider another example. Under U.S. law, certain 
bankruptcy-related offerings of securities by a debtor enjoy exemption 
from otherwise applicable U.S. securities laws.155  Should all or part of 
 
 
150. See Westbrook & Trautman, supra note 9, at 661–62. 
151. See id. at 661 (regarding choice of law); See Brussels & Lugano Conventions, supra 
note 78, art. 16(1) (regarding exclusive jurisdiction of courts where immovable property is 
situated). 
152. Security interests present similar issues. A creditor’s secured status in bankruptcy 
generally depends on its secured status outside of bankruptcy. Analysts generally agree that 
this question of secured status should be determined based on nonbankruptcy law, while the 
effect of that status in bankruptcy is a question of bankruptcy law. See Westbrook & Trautman, 
supra note 9, at 661; see also Ulrich Drobnig, Secured Credit in International Insolvency 
Proceedings, 33 Tex. Int’l L.J. 53, 65 (1998). This distinction may prove elusive in particular 
cases. 
153. See, e.g., Ohio v. Kovacs, 469 U.S. 274 (1985) (holding that prepetition environ- 
mental clean-up obligation was liability on a claim and therefore subject to bankruptcy 
discharge); Midlantic Nat’l Bank v. N.J. Dept. of Envtl. Prot., 474 U.S. 494 (1986) (holding 
that Chapter 7 trustee may not abandon contaminated estate property in contravention of local 
health and safety laws); New York v. Exxon Corp., 932 F.2d 1020 (2d Cir. 1991) (finding that 
city’s nonbankruptcy action for prepetition clean-up reimbursement costs fell within police 
and regulatory exception to automatic stay). See generally LoPucki, Cooperative Territorial- 
ity, supra note 24, at 2237 (discussing indeterminacy of scope of universalist bankruptcy 
jurisdiction). 
154. These issues are not likely to be clarified over time. Even if some issues recur, 
different courts from different legal regimes may take different approaches, with none binding 
on any other. See Stephan, supra note 17, at 792 (discussing lack of density and stability of 
international commercial law). 
155. See 11 U.S.C. § 1125 (1994). See generally Richard E. Mendales, We Can Work It 
Out: The Interaction of Bankruptcy and Securities Regulation in the Workout Context, 46 
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the local securities regulation as applied to debtor firms be considered a 
part of the local “bankruptcy law” overridden by a universalist assertion 
of extraterritorial bankruptcy jurisdiction? 
The answer to these questions are not straightforward and may de- 
pend on the specific contexts in which they are raised. “Analytically, one 
must determine the character of the issue before determining the govern- 
ing law.”156 Given the complexity of large multinational firms and the 
unique issues that may arise in particular cases, characterization of legal 
issues will often have to be improvised. Universalism transplants one 
state’s bankruptcy regime into another’s legal system, raising unavoid- 
able issues concerning the scope and boundaries of the foreign regime. 
The resolution of issues that may be critical to specific cases will often 
have to be tailored on an ad hoc basis.157 As with the determination of the 
debtor’s home country, these interface issues will often have to be de- 





Rutgers L. Rev. 1211 (1994). For discussion of the opposite problem—opting out of U.S. 
securities regulation and effects on the domestic bankruptcy regime—see Choi & Guzman, 
Portable Reciprocity, supra note 12, at 936. 
156. Westbrook & Trautman, supra note 9, at 586. 
157. The complexity of the choice of law rules of the European Union Insolvency Regula- 
tion shows the difficulty of elaborating bankruptcy choice of law rules with particularity. See 
Council Regulation 1346/2000 on Insolvency Proceedings, 2000 OJ (L 160) 1 [hereinafter EU 
Insolvency Regulation]. The EU Insolvency Regulation institutes a compromise system that 
incorporates aspects of both universalism and territoriality. It provides for a universalist main 
proceeding, which is conducted in the state where the “centre of a debtor’s main interests is situ- 
ated,” see id. art. 3(1), and which has extraterritorial effect throughout the EU. See id. arts. 16–18. 
It is also apparently intended to “encompass the debtor’s assets on a worldwide basis and to af- 
fect all creditors, wherever located.” Ian F. Fletcher, Insolvency in Private International 
Law: National and International Approaches 260 (P.B. Carter QC ed., 1999). On the other 
hand, however, separate territorial proceedings are also authorized in states where the debtor has 
an establishment, preserving the ability of non-home countries to distribute value pursuant to 
their own local laws. See EU Insolvency Regulation, supra, art. 3(2). These secondary proceed- 
ings must be winding-up proceedings, and they only affect the debtor’s assets within the 
particular state. See id. art. 3(2)–(3). 
Article Four of the EU Insolvency Regulation identifies forum law as the basic choice of 
law for insolvency proceedings: “the law applicable to insolvency proceedings and their ef- 
fects shall be that of the Member State within the territory of which such proceedings are 
opened.” See id. art 4(1). Article Four relies on thirteen subsections for detail. See id. art. 4(2). 
Articles Five through Fifteen then elaborate specific exceptions. See id. arts. 5–15. For exam- 
ple, forum law will not displace other law otherwise applicable to an employment contract 
with respect to the effect of insolvency proceedings on that contract. See id. art. 10. The most 
dramatic exception, from a universalist perspective, is contained in Article Five, which pro- 
vides that as to debtor assets located outside the territory of the forum state, the situs law 
governing secured creditors’ rights in rem, including the right to seize and dispose of collat- 
eral, trumps forum law. See id. art. 5. 
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B. Consequences for Reciprocity 
Universalists do not contest the existence of these various muddy ar- 
eas that may require some exercise of judicial discretion.158 Instead, 
universalists contest their significance. Universalists admit that reliance 
on standards and judicial discretion may sacrifice a bit of predictability 
for creditors, but such indeterminacy at the margins is tolerable. In any 
event, universalism with standards is still an improvement over territori- 
ality.159 
To date, this debate over determinacy has focused on efficiency, i.e., 
whether indeterminacy does or does not undercut universalist claims of 
improved ex ante predictability. However, the effect of indeterminacy on 
the comparative efficiency of universalism only matters if we assume 
that an otherwise idealized universalist system is already in place. But 
that may never happen. A prior question exists concerning the political 
consequences of indeterminacy, in particular, its effect on reciprocity 
strategies among states. Even if fuzzy commitments would not under- 
mine the comparative efficiency of an otherwise idealized universalist 
system, fuzzy commitments will make the realization of that idealized 
system less likely. 
Reliance on standards implemented through ex post judicial discre- 
tion creates ambiguity concerning states’ commitment to universalism 
and makes reciprocal cooperation difficult to achieve. Any professed 
commitment may not be credible, so states will be reluctant to make or 
rely on such commitments ex ante.160 As important, the fuzzy quality of 
the commitment will make it difficult for one state to interpret whether 
another has cooperated or defected. A state’s refusal to defer to the edicts 
of foreign bankruptcy proceedings is certainly transparent, but whether 
that refusal breaches the state’s universalist commitment may be unclear 
in a given case. With fuzzy commitments, good faith disagreement over 
compliance issues will not be uncommon. 
With respect to identification of the home country, for example, 
certainty in most cases may not be good enough. Acting entirely in good 
faith, states will disagree as to which is the home country. Fuzzy 
commitments allow ostensibly cooperative states to assert plausible 




158. “The key point is that the line-drawing problem cannot be avoided; it can only be 
placed at different points on the commercial spectrum. . . .” Westbrook & Trautman, supra 
note 9, at 584. 
159. See Guzman, supra note 21, at 2208. 
160. See supra notes 125–126 and accompanying text. 
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reciprocity strategy at the heart of the development of universalist 
cooperation. Ambiguity enables State A to insist on its territorial 
prerogative, refusing to recognize any claimed extraterritorial effect of 
State B’s insolvency proceeding while also claiming no violation of its 
universalist commitment.161 In the face of ambiguous commitments, the 
best the two states may be able to do is a rough ad hoc territorial 
compromise.162 Two examples illustrate these points. 
1. Example 1: The European Union 
The history of EU negotiations over a cross-border insolvency con- 
vention exemplifies states’ reluctance to contract on the basis of 
ambiguous commitments. At one stage of negotiations, universalism had 
been considered and extensively discussed, but indeterminacy in the 
specification of the home country was a sticking point. 
[A]s regards the primary criterion based upon the location of the 
debtor’s ‘centre of administration’, there was scope for divergent 
approaches to be adopted when applying the concept to the facts 
of actual cases. Although each version of the Draft supplied a 
definition of the expression as meaning ‘the place where the 
debtor usually administers his main interests’, this appears only 
to raise a whole series of further questions. . . . Although both 
versions [of the Draft] embody a rebuttable presumption, in the 
case of firms, companies and legal persons, that the registered 
 
 
161. State A may even attempt its own universalist proceeding, claiming extraterritorial 
effect in State B. This would be necessary from State A’s perspective only if significant debtor 
assets were located in or otherwise subject to the de facto control of State B. 
162. International bankruptcy cooperation has already evolved in this direction. In the 
absence of any international framework for cooperation, judges and lawyers have fashioned ad 
hoc “protocols” in particular cases. As Evan D. Flaschen and Ronald J. Silverman explain: 
In the absence of a formal treaty, practitioners and courts have created what are es- 
sentially case-specific, private international insolvency treaties. 
. . . The Protocols that have been implemented to date have been influenced both 
by considerations of universality and certain constraints of territoriality. They strive, 
in the first instance, to promote an efficient, worldwide coordination and resolution 
of multiple insolvency proceedings. At the same time, they serve to protect funda- 
mental, local rights material to each of the legal fora involved. 
. . . Although the relief provided by Protocols necessarily varies to suit circum- 
stances and legal environments, the essence of the Protocols is to provide a 
mechanism that controls how the parties will communicate, take actions, and apply 
both procedural and substantive elements of law. 
Evan D. Flaschen & Ronald J. Silverman, Cross-Border Insolvency Cooperation Protocols, 33 
Tex. Int’l L.J. 587, 589 (1998) (citations omitted). 
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office is the place where the debtor’s main interests are usually 
administered, the manner of rebutting this presumption, and the 
degree of proof needed, are left uncertain. Given the scope for 
different views regarding what amount to a debtor’s ‘main’ in- 
terests, the potential instability of this basis of jurisdiction was 
disturbing.163 
This indeterminacy made universalism problematic, and states were 
unwilling to commit to it. 
The EU Insolvency Regulation that finally emerged in May 2000 is 
essentially a territorial system with universalist pretensions.164 It gives a 
formal nod to universalism, providing for a “main proceeding” in the 
state where the “centre of a debtor’s main interests” is located, with ex- 
traterritorial effect throughout the EU.165 But the Regulation allows 
territorial winding-up proceedings as well: in any other state in which 
the debtor has an establishment, a “secondary proceeding” can be initi- 
ated. This winding-up proceeding—essentially a liquidation—trumps the 
main proceeding as to assets located in that state.166 
2. Example 2: Maxwell Communications 
The famous Maxwell case167 provides a nice illustration of the diffi- 
culties of identifying the home country. While admittedly, neither the 
United States nor the United Kingdom—the two states primarily in- 
volved—had undertaken a clear universalist commitment,168 and 
therefore had no legal obligation to defer, it would be difficult to imagine 
 
 
163. See Fletcher, supra note 157, at 253 n.21 (discussing negotiation of 1970 and 
1980 draft treaties). 
164. The EU Insolvency Regulation effectively legislates the provisions of the European 
Union Convention on Insolvency Proceedings, which was duly negotiated among EU mem- 
bers but never entered into force because the United Kingdom’s subsequent refusal to ratify. 
See European Union Convention on Insolvency Proceedings, opened for signature, Nov. 23, 
1995, 35 I.L.M. 1223 (1996) [hereinafter EU Insolvency Convention]. The UK refusal appar- 
ently had nothing to do with the convention itself but with some concurrent friction over 
Continental reluctance to allow imports of UK beef following the scare over mad cow disease. 
Following expiration of the ratification period for the treaty, the EU Council promulgated the 
same rules in the form of a regulation. 
165. See EU Insolvency Regulation, supra note 157, arts. 3(1), 16–18. 
166.  See id., art. 3(2)–(3). 
167. Maxwell Communication Corp. v. Barclays Bank (In re Maxwell Communication 
Corp.), 170 B.R. 800 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1994), aff’d, 186 B.R. 807 (S.D.N.Y. 1995), aff ’d, 93 
F.3d 1036 (2d Cir. 1996). 
168. Some universalists claim that Section 304 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. 
§ 304, expresses a U.S. commitment to universalism. See Westbrook, Global Solution, supra 
note 8, at 2323. Others find Section 304 indeterminate. See Bebchuk & Guzman, supra note 
30, at 783. 
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that either state would have relinquished its claim to home country status 
in any event. 
Maxwell Communications was a multinational publishing empire 
headquartered in England, from where it was managed and whence its 
financial affairs were conducted. While its major debts were incurred in 
England, however, its principal assets were in the United States. Two 
U.S. publishing companies wholly owned by Maxwell, Macmillan, Inc. 
and Official Airline Guide, Inc., accounted for about 80% of Maxwell’s 
assets.169 
Maxwell initially petitioned for an administration in England,170 but 
when the judge appointed administrators not to the liking of the com- 
pany, the company filed a Chapter 11 petition with the U.S. bankruptcy 
court in New York.171 Most universalists would probably agree that the 
United Kingdom was the home country.172 However, the U.S. court re- 
tained primary jurisdiction over the case, along with the U.K. court. This 
retention of jurisdiction was no surprise, given the sheer size of the es- 
tate, the value of assets in the United States, and perhaps the professional 
fees at stake.173 
[M]ost of the debtor’s assets were in the United States. This fact 
was no doubt an important part of Judge Brozman’s [the U.S. 
bankruptcy judge’s] insisting on retaining United States jurisdic- 
tion and requiring the concurrence of a United States examiner 
in major decisions in the case. Yet the court had recognized from 
the start that the center of gravity of the company was in the 
United Kingdom, the location of its principal executive offices. 
For that very reason, the court had ceded primary authority for 
corporate governance to the British administrators, while pro- 




169. See Maxwell, 170 B.R. at 802. In 1988, Maxwell had acquired Macmillan for $2.6 
billion and Official Airline Guide for $750 million. See id. These two subsidiaries in turn 
owned assets all over the world. See Westbrook, Global Solution, supra note 8, at 2321 n.184. 
170. Administration is a rescue proceeding under English law. See infra note 178. 
171. See Leonard Hoffman, L.J., Cross-Border Insolvency: A British Perspective, 64 
Fordham L. Rev. 2507, 2514 (1996). 
172. See Westbrook, Lessons of Maxwell, supra note 75, at 2537, 2541 n.44 (noting that 
Maxwell’s “center of gravity” was in the United Kingdom, and that the company was “essen- 
tially English”). Universalists identify principal place of business and center of main interests 
as appropriate standards for determining the home country, while rejecting location of assets 
as ordinarily indeterminate and subject to manipulation. See supra note 146; Guzman, supra 
note 21, at 2207. 
173. See LoPucki, Cooperation in International Bankruptcy, supra note 25, at 721 (not- 
ing significance of professional fees in courts’ competition for cases). 
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maintenance of the Chapter 11 case and appointment of the ex- 
aminer.174 
Maxwell’s bankruptcy proceeded simultaneously in both courts. The 
U.K. administrators and the U.S. examiner, appointed by the U.S. judge 
to work with the administrators, worked out a “Protocol” to govern the 
conduct of the joint proceedings.175 Ultimately, a “Plan and Scheme” was 
formulated, which complied with the laws of both jurisdictions,176 pursu- 
ant to which Maxwell’s businesses were sold as going concerns and 
creditors were paid.177 
Maxwell no doubt represents a remarkable achievement in terms of 
cooperation and coordination in an enormously complex international 
bankruptcy. However, it also offers a stark illustration of a type of case 
for which the universalist home country standard and judicial discretion 
would yield indeterminacy, requiring ad hoc territorial compromise. 
Jay Westbrook portrays Maxwell as the unusual case “where the 
debtor’s home country might be subject to some plausible debate.”178  But 
 
 
174. Westbrook, Lessons of Maxwell, supra note 75, at 2537 (emphasis supplied). 
175. See in re Maxwell Communication Corp., 170 B.R. 802 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1994), 
aff’d, 186 B.R. 807 (S.D.N.Y. 1995), aff’d, 93 F.3d 1036 (2d Cir. 1996). 
176. See id. The single scheme represented both a plan of reorganization under U.S. law 
and a scheme of arrangement under U.K. law. See id. 
177. See id. 
178. See Westbrook, Lessons of Maxwell, supra note 75, at 2541. Westbrook has also at- 
tempted a universalist rehabilitation of Maxwell, portraying it recently as a “classic application 
of modified universalism.” He claims that the case was “centralized” in the United Kingdom, 
and that the U.S. examiner merely stood by to guard U.S. interests. Westbrook, Global Solu- 
tion, supra note 8, at 2321. However, the fact that the Plan and Scheme was required to 
comply with U.S. as well as British law belies Westbrook’s characterization of only incidental 
U.S. court involvement. 
Moreover, comments by the British judge in Maxwell paint an entirely different picture. 
The interjection of the U.S. bankruptcy system was no trivial matter from the British perspec- 
tive. English administration is a very different creature from Chapter 11 in the United States, 
which is an arrangement negotiated among debtor management and creditors. See Tung, Con- 
firmation and Claims Trading, supra note 5, at 1689 (describing plan confirmation process). 
The English administrator, by contrast, does not need to negotiate with creditors or the 
debtor’s management, but instead takes complete control of the debtor company in a matter of 
hours after his appointment. “He has full powers to do whatever he likes. . . . He can employ 
the old management if he likes, but if he decides not to, he simply collects the keys of their 
automobiles and leaves them to go home on the subway.” Hoffman, L.J., supra note 171, at 
2514–15. For the administrators of Maxwell, Chapter 11 was something of a culture shock. 
[T]he English administrators found that they had to deal with an Examiner who was 
responsible to a judge who in turn had to have regard to the various interest groups 
who jockey for position in any Chapter 11 proceedings. Even the old management, 
who would simply have been shown the door in England, had their leverage which 
enabled them to keep a place at the negotiating table. The administrators therefore 
found that to get anything done—for example, to raise interim finance to keep the 
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even if the number of these cases is small, the cases are likely to be sig- 
nificant. States will be most likely to vie for home country status—or at 
least contest other states’ claims to such status—in cases involving sig- 
nificant local interests on each side, cases involving large firms with 
significant assets and huge liabilities at issue, cases for which the imme- 
diate costs of deferring are quite high. Given the stakes in a case like 
Maxwell, any plausible claim to home country status will likely be 
pressed by each state. Likewise, even where the identity of the home 
country is not in dispute, non-home countries can be expected to press 
for a narrow jurisdiction for the home country court. They will define 
broadly the scope of what count as local nonbankruptcy issues, to be 
determined by local courts according to local law.179 
 
* * * 
 
Fuzzy commitments allow each state to assert plausible good faith 
claims to compliance. This lack of clarity weakens the credibility of any 
universalist commitment and creates problems of misperception and 
misinterpretation: states will have trouble distinguishing cooperation 
from defection.180 The ambiguity inherent in standards, and haziness with 
respect to whether the particular application of a standard was “correct” 




subsidiary companies going—required a great deal of expensive and time- 
consuming negotiation. 
Id. At the end of the day, the English administrators opted for the Protocol simply because it 
was less expensive than trying to have the U.S. Chapter 11 proceeding terminated. See id. at 
2516. It is quite clear from the British perspective that administration was held hostage to the 
structure and process of Chapter 11. 
[T]he administrators told me that they were having trouble in New York. Naturally 
they would have preferred simply to take charge of everything as they were used to 
doing in England. That would have been quicker and cheaper. But they had been 
advised that an attempt to terminate the Chapter 11 proceedings in New York would 
be expensive and delay matters without necessarily being successful. So they felt 
that the interests of creditors were best served by agreeing to the Protocol. 
Id. at 2515–16. 
179. Issues concerning the interface between home country bankruptcy jurisdiction and 
local nonbankruptcy jurisdiction will be difficult to anticipate or resolve ex ante through clear 
rules. Instead, as with identification of the home country, resolution of jurisdictional interface 
issues will depend on judges’ discretionary application of imprecise standards ex post. See 
supra notes 153–157 and accompanying text. 
180. This credible commitment problem contributed to states disaffection for universal- 
ism in negotiations preceding the EU Insolvency Regulation. See Fletcher, supra note 157, 
at 253 & n.21. 
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on what constitutes cooperation versus defection. Therefore, the admin- 
istering of appropriate rewards and punishments becomes difficult. 
Ambiguity and uncertainty about defection . . . wreak  havoc 
with [the reciprocity] mechanism of sustaining cooperation. Un- 
der many circumstances, determining whether a state’s actions 
constitute defection may be difficult or impossible. For example, 
in the presence of an unforeseen contingency, reasonable people 
may disagree about how a given agreement should be applied. 
When they disagree, they cannot coordinate their responses, im- 
plying that full cooperation cannot be sustained.181 
Even with perfect monitoring and ability to identify defection, coop- 
eration is not easy to sustain. But when “noise” is introduced, sustained 
cooperation becomes even less likely. For example, even if—in the ab- 
sence of uncertainty—two states could coordinate on playing Tit for Tat 
strategies to yield a cooperative equilibrium,182 introducing uncertainty 
reduces both states’ long-run average payoffs to no better than random 
plays.183 Moreover, this result obtains even if only a very low probability 
of misperception exists. A low probability simply means that it will take 
longer for a misperception to arise, but once it does, it will also take 
longer to clear up.184 In other words, any noise renders Tit for Tat no bet- 
ter than random plays.185 
In a noisy environment, more generous strategies than Tit for Tat 
may enable improved cooperation. For example, a modified Tit for Tat 
strategy that forbears from retaliating for some percentage of the other 
player’s perceived defections has been shown to be effective in noisy 




181. Barry R. Weingast, A Rational Choice Perspective on the Role of Ideas: Shared Be- 
lief Systems and State Sovereignty in International Cooperation, 23 Pol. & Soc’y. 449, 450 
(1995). See also Oye, supra note 83, at 15 (discussing conditions of play that may limit effec- 
tiveness of reciprocity strategies). 
182. See supra note 138. 
183. Per Molander, The Optimal Level of Generosity in a Selfish, Uncertain Environ- 
ment, 29 J. Conflict Res. 611, 612 (1985); Nalebuff, supra note 130, at 93. Once a mistake 
occurs, Tit for Tat causes the mistake to echo back and forth, as each state retaliates for the 
other state’s prior defection. In this process of punishing perceived defections, a mistake is as 
likely to get compounded as it is to be fixed. 
184. See Nalebuff, supra note 130, at 93. 
185. See Molander, supra note 183, at 612. If the probability of misperception reaches 
fifty percent, then cooperation becomes hopeless. Given the slim prospects for cooperation, 
each state might as well defect in every round. See Nalebuff, supra note 130, at 93. 
186. See Jianzhong Wu & Robert Axelrod, How to Cope with Noise in the Iterated Pris- 
oner’s Dilemma, 39 J. Conflict Res. 183, 184 (1995). See also Jonathan Bendor, Roderick 
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dampens the effects of mistaken vendettas between players. The more 
forgiving the strategy, the more quickly an error can be corrected and 
cooperation restored. However, adopting a generous or forgiving strategy 
comes with a cost: generosity exposes a player to greater risk of exploi- 
tation.187 The immediate costs of generosity and forbearance may be 
quite high. A generous strategy may therefore be unattractive for many 
states. 
Without accurate matching of rewards and punishments to coopera- 
tion and defection, any message among players becomes garbled. 
Reciprocity is frustrated; cooperation is undermined. 
 
C. The Role of Courts and Judges 
Compounding the problem of fuzzy commitments, the involvement 
of courts and judges in deciding questions of universalist recognition 
creates problems for cooperation. In most industrial countries, a corpo- 
rate insolvency proceeding is a legal proceeding. It is filed with a court 
and monitored by a judge, who is the logical candidate to decide ques- 
tions of cross-border recognition. Establishing conditional policies is 
politically difficult in any event.188 Implementing conditional strategies 
through courts and judges may be futile. 
By hypothesis, states enjoy long-run payoffs from universalist coop- 
eration (i.e., extraterritorial application of their bankruptcy laws in 
appropriate cases) and suffer long-run punishments from defection (i.e., 
nonrecognition of their extraterritorial assertions of bankruptcy jurisdic- 
tion). However, judges are not states; though states may be repeat 
players in the universalist cooperation game, judges typically are not.189 
For each judge, the decision whether to defer to a foreign insolvency 
proceeding looks more like a one-shot game. The judge will understand 
 
 
M. Kramer, & Suzanne Stout, When in Doubt . . . Cooperation in a Noisy Prisoner’s Di- 
lemma, 35 J. Conflict Res. 691 (1991) (discussing generous variations of Tit for Tat). 
187. See Bendor et al., supra note 186, at 712. Prisoners’ dilemma tournament experi- 
ments in noisy environments show a sharp trade off between generosity and exploitability. See 
Jonathan Bendor, Uncertainty and the Evolution of Cooperation, 37 J. Conflict Res. 709 
(1993). 
188. See supra note 139. 
189. Some states might have only one or a few judges or other officials charged with 
overseeing corporate bankruptcies. The United States. is arguably moving in that direction, as 
the district of Delaware now fields over sixty percent of all large public company bankruptcy 
filings in the United States. See Lynn M. LoPucki, The Failure of Public Company Bankrupt- 
cies in Delaware and New York: Empirical Evidence of a Race to the Bottom, 54 Vand. L. 
Rev. 231, at 234–35 (2001). Even in that case, however, courts and judicial officers will still 
likely suffer from the institutional deficiencies described in the text that preclude their effec- 
tive implementation of reciprocity strategies. 
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the immediate prejudice to local interests from deferring to a foreign 
proceeding, but may not perceive or care about the long-term conse- 
quences of defection. The judge’s dominant single-play strategy is 
therefore defection.190 
Judges and courts are not institutionally equipped to play iterated 
games. Each judge applies laws to a specific case. Individual judges will 
ordinarily have neither the mandate nor the resources to follow the vari- 
ous rounds of play across cases. Each judge will therefore have difficulty 
matching a “tit” to the appropriate “tat.”191 Judges will be unable to dis- 
pense rewards and punishments appropriately.192 In addition, judges do 
not individually enjoy payoffs from cooperation or suffer punishments 
from defection. They are not charged with the representation of state 
interests over time as are the political branches of government— 
legislatures and executive officials—and therefore are unlikely to inter- 
nalize and effect the long-run maximization goals of their respective 
states.193 Officers of the political branches may be appropriate agents to 
dole out rewards and punishments, but judges are not. The judicial func- 
tion does not lend itself well to conducting foreign relations while 
deciding specific cases.194 
 
 
190. See Dodge, supra note 83: 
While it may be true that states will continue to decide choice-of-law cases indefi- 
nitely, for the judge who makes the choice-of-law decision each case looks more 
like a single play game. Thus there is little reason to think that cooperation will 
evolve in conflicts or extraterritoriality based on the individual decisions of judges. 
Id. at 162; Joel P. Trachtman, Conflict of Laws and Accuracy in the Allocation of Government 
Responsibility, 26 Vand J. Transnat’l L. 975, 1022 (1994). 
191. See supra note 129 (describing Tit for Tat strategy in repeat prisoner’s dilemma). 
192. Cf. Sterk, supra note 83, at 1009 (noting similar problems for game theory predic- 
tions of cooperation in choice of law context). 
193. Public choice scholars remind us as well of the political agency costs. Judges may 
have private interests that differ from the national interest. O’Hara & Ribstein, supra note 87, 
at 1226. 
194. [T]he political branches are better equipped to weigh the long-term benefits of 
compromise against the short-term detriments of deferring to another jurisdiction in a particu- 
lar case. “The stimuli in the diplomatic forum that encourage effective balancing of short term 
against long term interests are not operative in the municipal judicial forum except in very 
general terms.” Dodge, supra note 83, at 159 (quoting Harold G. Maier, Interest Balancing 
and Extraterritorial Jurisdiction, 31 Am. J. Comp. L. 579, 594 (1983)). See generally Oye, 
supra note 83, at 16 (discussing control issues in effecting reciprocity). 
These judge-related issues will vary from state to state. One could imagine a state with 
relatively few insolvency judges and other professionals, who as a group take a strong interna- 
tional and universalist outlook. If the norms of this group developed in a way that paralleled 
the state’s preference for universalist cooperation, then this professional elite might possibly 
evolve into an effective enforcer of universalist reciprocity. On the other hand, in a state with a 
large and diffuse group of insolvency judges and professionals, the emergence of group norms 
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Regardless of other obstacles to universalist cooperation, because of 
the role that judges and courts play in deciding on universalist recogni- 
tion in specific cases, the repeat play that characterizes many 
international commercial interactions will not likely cause the emer- 
gence of universalist cooperation. 
 
D. Numbers Problems 
Thus far, we have focused primarily on our hypothetical two-state 
world and considered only the two-player prisoners’ dilemma. When we 
move to a world with many states, “numbers problems” arise. Even if 
bilateral universalism were not difficult enough to realize, multilateral 
universalist cooperation is even less tractable. As the number of players 
rises, cooperation issues become far more complex. Both establishing 
and maintaining cooperation become more difficult. 
The existence of commonly shared interests becomes less likely as 
the number of potential adherents to a universalist arrangement in- 
creases. Recall that in our two-state model, we assumed that in both 
states’ preference orderings, the mutual cooperation outcome— 
reciprocal universalism—was preferred to mutual defection.195 We were 
willing to grant this assumption in order to present an optimistic case for 
universalism. We also noted, however, reasons why many states would 
not prefer mutual universalism, but would instead prefer territoriality, 
regardless of another state’s willingness to cooperate.196 As the number of 
states rises, the assumption that each state prefers mutual cooperation to 
mutual defection becomes a very strong one. Relaxing the assumption, 
of course, means that multilateral universalism is doomed. 
Even retaining this strong assumption about preference orderings, 
states’ heterogeneity makes it less and less likely that the necessary con- 
ditions for sustained cooperation will hold for all of them. One state may 
discount the future severely. Another may have special domestic political 
 
 
favoring a unified universalist approach may be less likely. See Robert C. Ellickson, Order 
Without Law 177 (1991) (discussing significance of close-knit settings for emergence of 
welfare-maximizing norms). States might respond to this problem by removing cooperation 
decisions from judges and centralizing them in the hands of trade or foreign affairs officials. 
Jay Westbrook has proposed that states create domestic institutions to certify for their respec- 
tive judiciaries which other states qualify for reciprocity. See supra note 44. This thoughtful 
approach might reduce some information costs, but it may cause other internal problems, as 
states attempt to restructure domestically-focused judicial and administrative processes to 
account for foreign affairs concerns. 
195. That is, CC > DD. See supra Part III.B. 
196. That is, a state may prefer deadlock: DC > CC and DD > CC. See supra Part II and 
note 113. 
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difficulty implementing a reciprocity strategy.197 Another may anticipate 
only infrequent iterations of the international bankruptcy game, insuffi- 
cient to make long-term cooperation worthwhile. 
In particular, recall that in our two-state discussion, we noted that 
roughly symmetric investment flows between our two states would be an 
important condition related to “iterativeness”—each state’s expectation 
concerning the frequency of iterations of the international bankruptcy 
game.198 With multiple states, a rough multilateral symmetry with respect 
to investment flows would also be required, so that each state might ex- 
pect future benefits as the home country. However, as the number of 
states increases, fulfillment of this condition becomes more and more 
unlikely.199 
Even if conditions for cooperation are promising among multiple 
states, transaction and information costs increase with the number of 
states. Identifying shared interests and negotiating workable arrange- 
ments to the satisfaction of all the players becomes more expensive. In 
addition, as the number of states increases, each state will have more 
difficulty anticipating the future behavior of other states and assessing 
the prospective value of future cooperative payoffs.200 
Consider the added complexity of negotiating a multilateral univer- 
salist agreement. Imagine, for example, several states—otherwise 
favorably disposed to universalism absent these transaction and informa- 
tion costs—attempting to define the scope of the universalist choice of 
law rule and to clarify the interface between bankruptcy law and non- 
bankruptcy law.201 They must in effect decide what counts as a 
bankruptcy issue (for which home country law applies) and distinguish 
that from nonbankruptcy issues (as to which local law would apply). 
Each state will have particular issue areas (for example, environmental 
 
 
197. See supra note 139. 
198. See supra note 132 and accompanying text. 
199. For states with strong commercial ties—the states of the European Community, for 
example, or NAFTA or ASEAN—this condition might obtain. But even then, all the other 
factors affecting cooperation would still have to align properly. Within most groups of states, 
the frequency of expected iterations will differ as among the various pairs or coalitions, mak- 
ing for uneven cooperative impulses. State A may anticipate frequent crossborder insolvency 
interaction with State B but not State C. Anticipating infrequent iterations with State C, State 
A may be more willing to defect as to State C than to State B, since any cooperation by State 
A with State C in the current round may be reciprocated only far into the future. Discounting 
that future payoff to present value, State A may decide that the short-term gain from current 
defection is worth more. Uneven cooperation will frustrate the emergence of cooperative 
norms within the group as a whole. 
200. See Oye, supra note 83, at 19. 
201. See discussion supra Part IV.A. 





56 Michigan Journal of International Law [Vol. 23:1 
 
or securities regulation202) that it will wish to insulate from possible dis- 
placement by the bankruptcy rules of each other state acting as home 
country. To accomplish this, each state will have to obtain information 
about every other state’s bankruptcy rules and sensitive issue areas, and 
may need to engage in a bilateral negotiation with each other state to 
resolve any potential conflict. With two states, of course, only one bilat- 
eral negotiation need occur. With three states, three separate bilateral 
negotiations may be required. With four states, the number of bilateral 
negotiations jumps to six, and so on.203 These increased transaction and 
information costs erode the margin between the cooperative payoff and 
the short-term gain from defection, making defection all the more attrac- 
tive and cooperative agreements all the more difficult to achieve.204 
Recognizing and punishing defection also becomes more compli- 
cated as numbers increase.205 I have already noted that reliance on 
standards and discretion will engender ambiguity and misperception. 
With multiple states, this problem is greatly exacerbated. For example, 
even if identification of the home country were not controversial, the 
number of unique interfaces between home country bankruptcy law and 
local nonbankruptcy law multiplies as more states are involved. The 
chances for previously unanticipated contingencies increase, thereby 
increasing the likelihood of ambiguity in application of the original uni- 
versalist agreement. Without an institution to provide definitive 
resolution of ambiguities and to coordinate punishments for defection,206 
the potential for inconsistent cooperation among participants is high. 
 
 
202. See supra note 153 and accompanying text. 
203. For n states, the number of bilateral negotiations will equal  n * (n − 1) . 
2 
A casual look at the choice of law provisions in the EU Insolvency Regulation illustrates 
the complexity of these bankruptcy-related choice of law issues for multiple states. See supra 
note 157. See also Ian F. Fletcher, The European Union Convention on Insolvency Proceed- 
ings: Choice-of-Law Provisions, 33 Tex. Int’l L.J. 119 (1998). The existence of the already 
well-developed and multifaceted EU regime no doubt facilitated negotiation of the EU Insol- 
vency Convention, which was the precursor to the EU Insolvency Regulation. See supra note 
157. See generally Keohane, supra note 86, at ch. 6 (explaining importance of international 
regimes for reducing transaction costs and disseminating information). Absent the EU regime, 
it is highly unlikely that such an agreement could have been reached. 
204. See Oye, supra note 83, at 19. 
205. See Axelrod & Keohane, supra note 83, at 235. 
206. See Weingast, supra note 181, at 452 (describing coordination problem of interpret- 
ing agreement in light of unanticipated situation); cf. Giovanni Maggi, The Role of 
Multilateral Institutions in International Trade Cooperation, 89 Am. Econ. Rev. 190 (1999) 
(arguing that even without direct enforcement power, WTO through dispute settlement panels 
acts as multilateral enforcement mechanism by verifying and publicizing violations, thereby 
causing violator’s loss of reputation in trading community). 
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This will inhibit the development of stable multilateral cooperative 
norms. The sure payoff from immediate defection becomes much more 
attractive, and the likelihood of defection increases.207 For all these rea- 
sons, decentralized multilateral cooperative arrangements are unlikely to 
arise, and any that do will be quite fragile.208 
With the bankruptcy of an integrated multinational firm, all affected 
states must cooperate in order to achieve the optimal cooperative out- 
come,209 but one player’s defection will often trigger the defection of 
others. In the Felixstowe case,210 these considerations played at least 
some part in an English court’s refusal to defer to a U.S. proceeding. The 
English court refused to turn over local English assets of a U.S. debtor in 
Chapter 11 proceedings.211 Separate insolvency proceedings were appar- 
ently also underway or pending in France and several other European 
countries. Besides the fact that English creditors would have been preju- 
diced in the U.S. proceeding,212 the English court noted that in the French 
insolvency proceeding, the French court likewise refused to defer to the 




207. See Oye, supra note 83, at 19. 
208. “Although game theory does not rule out the possibility of n-state cooperation, the 
assumptions required for such an outcome are quite strong and usually unrealistic. For this 
reason, we doubt the utility of n-player prisoner’s dilemmas as an explanation for multilateral 
or “universal” behavioral regularities.” Goldsmith & Posner, supra note 86, at 1130. Cf. Miles 
Kahler, Multilateralism with Small and Large Numbers, 46 Int’l Org. 681 (1992) (describing 
institutional devices to facilitate multilateral cooperation with large numbers); Robert Pahre, 
Multilateral Cooperation in an Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma, 38 J. Conflict Resol. 326 
(1994) (arguing that under certain assumptions, multilateralism may be more effective for 
cooperation than bilateralism). 
209. A situation involving multiple players does not always create an n-player prisoners’ 
dilemma, but a series of bilateral prisoners’ dilemmas between the different pairs of players. In 
that situation, resolution of one bilateral interaction would not directly affect the outcomes of 
others. See Snidal, Game Theory, supra note 83, at 52–53. With multilateral universalism, 
though, each defection may potentially reduce the cooperative payoffs for the remaining 
states, reducing the advantages of any universalist arrangement and encouraging further defec- 
tions. 
210. See Felixstowe Dock & Railway Co. v. U.S. Lines Inc., 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 76 (Q.B. 
1987). 
211. English law did not require any such turnover, but it was within the judge’s discre- 
tion. See id. at 76. 
212. Not only would English creditors do far better in a territorial distribution, but the 
contemplated reorganization would have eliminated the debtor’s European operations and 
instead concentrated resources in North America. Assets repatriated from England would 
therefore have funded a reorganization benefiting North American trade creditors by preserv- 
ing commercial relationships with the reorganized entity. English trade creditors, however, 
would see no such benefit. See id. at 77. 
213. Lord Hoffman explained: 
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The French court was willing to turn over assets to the U.S. court 
only after all French creditors had been paid in full.214 With little choice, 
the U.S. debtor had agreed to these French demands. This capitulation 
the English court read as “not only a serious breach of the [debtor’s] 
‘single proceedings’ theory, but also a preference (in the interests no 
doubt of expediency) of one particular group of creditors.”215 Therefore, 
the debtor’s arguments concerning a single insolvency administration 
and equal treatment of creditors were seriously undermined. 
Numbers problems have particular bite for universalism because 
claims concerning its efficiency advantages over territoriality depend on 
its widespread, if not universal, adoption. According to its advocates, 
universalism offers superior efficiency because it makes the location of 
the debtor’s assets irrelevant to creditors’ rights. Universalism therefore 
provides ex ante predictability to creditors,216 relieves them of the bur- 
dens of ex post monitoring of the debtor’s assets,217 and facilitates 
efficient administration of the debtor’s assets.218 
By contrast, the argument goes, territoriality suffers from the prob- 
lem of fleeing assets. Creditors cannot possibly predict their bankruptcy 
recoveries ex ante because the governing laws will change depending on 
the various locations of the debtor’s assets, “which may be spread among 
many jurisdictions and which may be moved at any time.”219 Creditors 
are therefore forced to monitor the locations of the debtor’s assets at all 
times and “must consider the laws of all jurisdictions in which assets are 
located, or into which assets may move.”220 Under universalism, only the 





The proposed scheme of reorganization was that the assets removed from England 
would be used to keep U.S. Lines going in the United States but that it would with- 
draw from the European market. This meant that the Felixstowe Dock company [an 
English creditor] would gain nothing from the reorganization. Furthermore, it was 
clear that the French, who have a highly developed sense of their own national in- 
terest, were for similar reasons not going to allow any of the assets in France to be 
sent to the United States. 
Hoffman, L.J., supra note 171, at 2513. 
214. French creditors successfully procured the arrest of two of the debtors ships, and 
the French courts would allow sale of the ships and repatriation of proceeds to the United 
States. only after all French creditors had been paid. See Felixstowe, 2 Lloyd’s Rep. at 94. 
215. Id. 
216. See Westbrook, Global Solution, supra note 8, at 2309. 
217. See Guzman, supra note 21, at 2207–08. 
218. See Westbrook, Global Solution, supra note 8, at 2309. 
219. Guzman, supra note 21, at 2207. 
220.  Id. at 2208. 
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simpler and more predictable than monitoring all the debtor’s assets all 
the time.221 
The trouble with this neat analysis, of course, is that it assumes the 
ubiquity of universalism. Universalism yields superior predictability, 
reduces monitoring costs, and renders asset location irrelevant only if all 
states adopt it. Otherwise, a debtor may always move its assets beyond 
the jurisdiction of the universalist court, just as under territoriality. Even 
if many states were to adopt universalism, a highly unlikely prospect, as 
shown in previous parts, plenty of amenable jurisdictions would still ex- 
ist in which debtors might park assets comfortably out of the reach of 
creditors. Absent highly unrealistic assumptions about the world, then, 
universalism is no better than territoriality with respect to ex ante pre- 
dictability and monitoring costs. Those arguments for universalism 
should therefore be put to rest.222 As important, in a world of incomplete 
universalism, the problem of fleeing assets frustrates achievement of the 
unified international administration of assets that is at the heart of the 
universalist proposal. 
Numbers problems suggest that even universalism among a relative 
handful of states (never mind ubiquity) is unlikely. However, large mul- 
tinational firms operate in dozens of states, and such firms will continue 
to grow in size and international reach. Even ignoring problems of stra- 
tegic asset transfer, any universalist arrangements would be inadequate 
to handle what will come to be routine international bankruptcies. 
 
V. Generalizing the Analysis: When Is Cooperation Possible? 
 
Conditions of play in international bankruptcy make it highly im- 
probable that multilateral universalism could emerge through simple 
reciprocity. International cooperation is possible, however. We observe it 
in other international prisoners’ dilemma settings,223 even in the face of 
these impediments that plague universalism. However, ready examples 
 
 
221. See Westbrook, Global Solution, supra note 8, at 2309; Guzman, supra note 21, at 
2207. 
222. Recently, Jay Westbrook has justifiably retreated a bit from the predictability thesis. 
See Westbrook, Global Solution, supra note 8, at 2326. 
223. Behavioral regularities that may resemble cooperation occur in other settings as 
well. Many of these settings, however, may instead involve the mere coincidence of states’ 
interests, coercion of one state by another, or coordination issues. None of these contexts pre- 
sent the difficult mixed motives at work in the prisoners’ dilemma or the concomitant 
cooperation problems. See generally Goldsmith & Posner, supra note 86 (discussing various 
contexts for behavioral regularities indiscriminately referred to as customary international 
law). 
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of the decentralized multilateral cooperation envisioned by universalists 
are scarce.224 Cooperation that overcomes these hurdles typically occurs 
within the context of international regimes and institutions.225 In this Part, 
I first discuss international cooperation that we do observe and the role 
that regimes and institutions play in facilitating it. Examples from inter- 
national trade illustrate cooperation that overcomes both vague 
commitments and problems associated with large numbers.226 I then ex- 
plore the possibilities for a universalist regime, briefly re-examining the 
recently promulgated EU Insolvency Regulation.227 Unfortunately for 
universalists, no universalist regime exists, despite ongoing institutional 
efforts at international bankruptcy reform. The EU case suggests possi- 
ble reasons for this absence of universalism and implies that even 
structured approaches to reform will not lead to universalism. 
 
A. A Role for Regimes and Institutions 
Vague commitments and multiple parties are not unique to the uni- 
versalist proposal. Yet in other contexts, cooperation occurs despite these 
impediments. Formal institutions can address vague commitments 
through processes of norm elaboration. They can solve numbers prob- 
lems by gathering and disseminating information among member states. 
Even in the face of intractable prisoners’ dilemma or deadlock problems 
that plague universalism, regimes and institutions can facilitate coopera- 





224. See supra note 44 and accompanying text. Theorists suggest that decentralized mul- 
tilateral cooperation could emerge only under fairly strong assumptions, for example, high 
quality information or highly coordinated strategies. See Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, 
Why States Act through Formal International Organizations, 42 J. Conflict Res. 3, 6 (1998); 
Michihiro Kandori, Social Norms and Community Enforcement, 59 Rev. Econ. Stud. 63 
(1992). 
225. “[I]nternational regimes and institutions acquire a central role in facilitating multi- 
lateral cooperation.” Licht, supra note 11, at 76. Stephen Krasner defines a regime as a “set[] 
of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which 
actors’ expectations converge in a given area of international relations.” Stephen D. Krasner, 
Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables, in Interna- 
tional Regimes 2 (Stephen D. Krasner ed., 1983). 
226. As for the problem of bankruptcy courts attempting to execute national reciprocity 
strategies, see supra Part IV.C., international institutions will not be able to offer much help. 
That problem is an internal one for each state to address. States might be able to centralize the 
function of identifying cooperative states deserving reciprocity from their domestic courts. 
However, this approach may raise other internal problems or may not be feasible because of 
internal constraints. See discussion, supra note 194. 
227. See EU Insolvency Regulation, supra note 157. 
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1. Norm Elaboration 
Institutions provide information and processes that can resolve the 
problem of fuzzy commitments. Professors Ken Abbott and Duncan 
Snidal refer to this function as “norm elaboration.”228 Bounded rationality 
and high transaction and information costs may make it difficult for 
states to write complete contracts (i.e., treaties that address all contin- 
gencies). Institutions provide processes by which rules and norms are 
elaborated, “fleshed out” in the context of particular disputes. The World 
Trade Organization (WTO) provides a salient example. While some as- 
pects of international trade rules are specific and the related state policies 
relatively transparent, —for instance, compliance with GATT tariff bind- 
ings,229 —a range of trade issues involve standards that raise problems of 
interpretation and opportunism.230 
For example, the propriety of antidumping duties turns on 
assessments of an imported product’s “normal value” and whether its 
importation causes “material injury” to a domestic industry.231 Temporary 
relief from import surges, so called “escape clause” relief, is justified 
when an importing country experiences increased imports that “cause or 
threaten  to  cause”  “serious  injury”  to  a  “domestic  industry”  that 
 
 
228. See Abbott & Snidal, supra note 224, at 15. See also Arthur A. Stein, Coordination 
and Collaboration: Regimes in an Anarchic World (describing role of regime in “specify[ing] 
what constitutes cooperation and what  constitutes  cheating”), in  International Regimes 
115, 128 (Stephen D. Krasner ed., 1983). 
229. See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, art. II, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 
T.I.A.S. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter GATT]. The WTO is the body that administers the 
GATT. It has performed this function since its creation in 1994. 
230. Scholars routinely model international trade as a prisoners’ dilemma. See, e.g., Ax- 
elrod, supra note 101, at 7; Maggi, supra note 206, at 195; Judith L. Goldstein & Stephen D. 
Krasner, Unfair Trade Practices: The Case for a Differential Response, Am. Econ. Rev. vol. 
74, No. 2 , 282 (May 1984). 
231. See GATT, art. VI(1). “Dumping” is the act or practice of cross-border predatory 
pricing. That is, a state exports its products at lowball prices in order either to drive out com- 
petitors in the importing country or to address a short-term overproduction problem. On the 
theory that dumping harms the importing country, GATT rules prohibit the practice, and the 
importing country may justifiably impose a duty to offset the margin of dumping. The point of 
this tax on the dumped product is to cause an increase in its sale price in the importing country 
market, thereby nullifying the unfair advantage it would otherwise have had relative to com- 
peting locally produced goods. 
Importing states’ latitude to impose duties in the face of alleged dumping, however, cre- 
ates opportunistic temptations for importing states. GATT therefore attempts to discipline 
antidumping duties and to curb the disguised protectionism that might otherwise arise. Under 
the GATT, an importing state may levy antidumping duties only on products selling in the 
local market at less than “normal value,” and only if such sales “cause[] or threaten[] material 
injury to an established industry” or “materially retard[] the establishment of a domestic in- 
dustry” in the importing state. See GATT, art. VI(1). 
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competes with the imported product.232 These terms are all quite 
malleable and susceptible of competing interpretations. States may 
reasonably disagree about their construction, and these areas present 
some of the thorniest trade issues because of the vague standards 
involved. 
Fortunately for trading nations, the WTO provides a means of clari- 
fying vague commitments and policing disguised trade protection. The 
WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) offers a process to re- 
solve trade disputes.233 If consultation fails to resolve a dispute, the DSU 
provides for the establishment of a panel of neutral parties to consider 
the dispute and render a binding decision.234 Appeal of a panel decision 
to the WTO Appellate Body is also possible.235 Through this process, the 
WTO clarifies vague standards and distinguishes true violations of trade 
obligations from misperceptions. Panels and the Appellate Body gather 
and disseminate information concerning alleged violations. The process 
resolves ambiguity and promulgates shared understandings about trade 
obligations. It facilitates monitoring and reciprocity among interested 
states, thereby promoting cooperation.236 
2. Solving Numbers Problems 
Regimes and institutions are also useful in overcoming numbers 
problems. Moreover, multilateral cooperation typically requires assis- 
tance   from   regimes   and   formal   institutions.   Regimes   lower   the 
 
 
232. See Agreement on Safeguards, Apr. 15, 1994, art. 2(1), Marrakesh Agreement Es- 
tablishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, The Legal Texts: The Results Of The 
Uruguay Round Of Multilateral Trade  Negotiations  275  (2d  ed.  2000)  [hereinafter 
The  Legal  Texts]. 
233. See generally Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of 
Disputes, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 
Annex 2, id. at 354, 33 I.L.M. 1125, 1226 (1994) [hereinafter DSU]. 
234. See id. art. 6. “Binding” is a relative term, of course. Even the trade retaliation that 
a panel may authorize does not ipso facto force a state into compliance with its obligations. 
235. See id. art. 17. 
236. See Maggi, supra note 206; Weingast, supra note 181, at 458. GATT/WTO relies on 
other institutional mechanisms to resolve ambiguity as well. While the DSU offers an adver- 
sarial process to resolve specific disputes, GATT/WTO has also institutionalized the Trade 
Policy Review Mechanism, a regular and more generalized review of members’ trade policies. 
Reviews occur periodically and do not depend on initiation by particular disgruntled states. 
See Trade Policy Review Mechanism, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the 
World Trade Organization, Annex 3, The Legal Texts, supra note 232, at 380 (1994). These 
sorts of periodic implementation review further increase information flow among members 
and reduce transaction costs to cooperation. For a helpful discussion of implementation review 
in the global environmental context, see Kal Raustiala, Compliance and Effectiveness in Inter- 
national Regulatory Cooperation, 32 Case W. Res. J. Int’l L. 387 (2000). 
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transaction and information costs that otherwise impede multilateral co- 
operation.237 They gather and disseminate information about member 
states, facilitating identification of shared interests and lowering the 
costs of negotiating agreements and monitoring compliance.238 Regimes 
may also facilitate collective enforcement of any agreements reached. 
Not only can regimes help to clarify vague commitments, as discussed 
above, but they lower the costs of promulgating these standards to multi- 
ple parties. Regimes may disseminate information about the compliance 
behavior of particular actors as well, facilitating the development and 
maintenance of reputations in multilateral settings and increasing the 
reputational costs of defection.239 Lower information costs in all these 
areas make cooperation payoffs relatively more attractive than defection, 
improving the chances of both reaching and sustaining multiparty 
agreements. This prospect bolsters the credibility of each state’s ex ante 
commitment to any agreement, further advancing the possibilities for 
multilateral cooperation. 
Again, the WTO provides a useful example. Its success at its func- 
tion of multilateral information dissemination has made it one of the 
most effective of international organizations. 
Observers . . . often argue that improving the quality and quan- 
tity of information about international trade policy has been one 
of the regime’s major contributions. More importantly, without 
the provision of data and information concerning members’ trade 
policies, behavior could not be effectively monitored and there- 
fore the ability to implement regime rules would suffer.240 
The WTO facilitates multilateral trade negotiations that enable 
greater trade liberalization than would occur under bilateral negotia- 
tions.241 In addition, to the extent that multilateral sanctions and 
enforcement pressure affect states’ trade behavior, the WTO plays a 




237. See supra Part IV.D. 
238. See Keohane, supra note 86, at ch. 6. See generally Ronald B. Mitchell, Sources of 
Transparency: Information Systems in International Regimes, 42 Int’l Stud. Q. 109 (1998). 
239. See Paul R. Milgrom et al., The Role of Institutions in the Revival of Trade: The 
Law Merchant, Private Judges, and the Champagne Fairs, 2 Econ. & Pol. 1 (1990) (describ- 
ing role of private law merchant in improving reputation system as device to promote honest 
trade in early Middle Ages). 
240. Jock Finlayson & Mark Zacher, The GATT and the Regulation of Trade Barriers: 
Regime Dynamics and Functions, 35 Int’l Org. 561, 587–88 (1981). 
241. See Maggi, supra note 206, at 193. 
242. See id. at 191. 
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These multilateral functions become especially important when power 
imbalances exist in bilateral relationships.243 
3. Issue Linkage 
Even if the conditions for cooperation do not obtain in a prisoners’ 
dilemma situation, or even if states are deadlocked—that is, they share 
no mutual interests at all244—all is not lost. A regime may still be able to 
induce cooperation by enabling a change in the payoffs of recalcitrant 
states, transforming what in isolation would present intractable prison- 
ers’ dilemma or deadlock games into more harmonious interactions. 
Linking issues, or embedding difficult negotiations within a larger set of 
issues, could reduce discord among states. “[A] given bargain is placed 
within the context of a more important long-term relationship in such a 
way that the long-term relationship affects the outcome of the particular 
bargaining process.”245 The presence of a regime expands the scope of 
issues over which member states may negotiate. This broader set of pos- 
sible trade-offs also creates temporal flexibility, enabling the realization 
of payoffs over a longer time horizon than would be possible in the ab- 
sence of existing institutionalized relationships. 
The TRIPS agreement,246 negotiated under the auspices of the Uru- 
guay Round of the GATT, provides a vivid recent example of issue 
linkage to overcome intractability. Before TRIPS, industrialized coun- 
tries and less developed countries (LDCs) were deadlocked over the 
issue of intellectual property (IP) protection. IP protection, like bank- 
ruptcy law, was a matter for individual states. Many LDCs found no use 
for domestic IP laws, surmising that the benefits would go primarily to 
industrial country firms and investors, who would reap monopoly profits 
from LDC markets. Without local IP laws, LDC markets were flooded 
with  low-cost  unauthorized  copies  of  industrial  countries’ products, 
 
 
243. See id. at 193. 
244. See supra note 113. 
245. Axelrod & Keohane, supra note 83, at 241. For example, in our original prisoners’ 
dilemma story, if each prisoner had the ability to harm the other’s family in the event of 
squealing, then the prisoners’ decisions on squealing become embedded within a larger set of 
relationships. The family linkage effectively changes each prisoner’s payoffs. Promised pun- 
ishments for squealing would reduce each prisoner’s defection payoffs, so that it would not 
pay for either prisoner to squeal. Silence would become the dominant strategy. 
The few modest treaty commitments that exist with respect to international insolvency are 
embedded in more comprehensive schemes of commercial cooperation. See Fletcher, supra 
note 157, at 232 (discussing existing international bankruptcy treaties). 
246. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, 
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, The Legal 
Texts, supra note 232, at 321, 33 I.L.M. 1125, 1197 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS]. 
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which were originally developed, designed, and produced under the pro- 
tective umbrella of industrial countries’ IP laws. The low-cost copies in 
LDC markets crowded out the more expensive industrial country prod- 
ucts, to the dismay of industrial country firms. 
GATT/WTO facilitated a viable TRIPS agreement by enabling in- 
dustrial countries to “pay” LDCs for their acceptance of TRIPS. 
Payment came in the form of improved access for LDC textile and agri- 
cultural exports in industrial country markets.247 The agreement was 
acceptable to industrial countries because in addition to setting minimum 
standards for IP protection, TRIPS explicitly relies on the threat of trade 
retaliation for enforcement.248 Embedding TRIPS negotiations and en- 
forcement within the greater GATT/WTO trade framework enabled a 
trade-off between industrial country IP concerns and LDC export con- 
cerns. In addition, tying TRIPS compliance to the basic WTO 
enforcement mechanism of trade retaliation made TRIPS attractive from 
industrial countries’ perspective. The linkages facilitated by the trade 
framework made the TRIPS agreement possible. 
As with TRIPS, linkages may be the only hope for facilitating uni- 
versalism among states with asymmetric preferences. For example, 
absent side payments, LDCs may be particularly unreceptive to univers- 
alism. Because multinational firms are much more likely to be 
headquartered in industrial countries, LDCs may anticipate regularly 
having to defer to industrial country bankruptcy regimes. By contrast, 
LDCs will only infrequently find themselves as the home country in a 
multinational bankruptcy, so their bankruptcy regimes will only infre- 
quently govern internationally.249 
 
B. A Universalist Regime? 
If regimes and institutions aid states in overcoming impediments to 
cooperation in other areas, is a similar strategy available for 
universalism? States interested in universalism might, for example, 
attempt to “piggyback” a universalist initiative on an existing regime in 
which they participate. Existing regimes enjoy economies of scale. With 
 
 
247. See Michael P. Ryan, The Function-Specific and Linkage-Bargain Diplomacy of In- 
ternational Intellectual Property Lawmaking, 19 U. Pa. J. Int’l Econ. L. 535, 560 (1998) 
(discussing critical issue linkage enabling TRIPS agreement). I refer to “GATT/WTO” be- 
cause before the Uruguay Round, the WTO did not exist. Instead, the term “GATT” referred 
either to the agreement itself or to the informal administration of the agreement that had 
evolved over the years since 1947. 
248. See DSU, supra note 233, art. 1. 
249. See supra note 113. 





66 Michigan Journal of International Law [Vol. 23:1 
 
an established regime, the marginal cost of dealing with a new issue is 
lower than if the issue were to be handled in isolation and from 
scratch.250 
Ironically, several international bankruptcy reform projects already 
exist—sponsored by major international institutions—and yet no univer- 
salist proposal has surfaced. The World Bank,251 the Asian Development 
Bank,252 the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development,253 
and other multilateral institutions already sponsor significant research 
and reform efforts on bankruptcy law.254 The International Monetary 
Fund has included bankruptcy law reform in its conditionality arrange- 
ments with Russia and Southeast Asian nations following their recent 
economic crises.255 UNCITRAL has promulgated a Model Insolvency 
Law256 that is under consideration for adoption in several countries, in- 
cluding the United States.257 The American Law Institute (ALI) sponsors 
an extensive Transnational Insolvency Project involving research and law 
reform goals among the NAFTA countries.258 And as previously dis- 
cussed, the European Union has devised an insolvency regulation to 
coordinate cross-border bankruptcies within the Union.259 
Despite these extensive reform projects and initiatives, no universal- 
ist instrument exists, even as a model for voluntary adoption. While it 
appears that the formal organizations already exist that could aid univer- 
 
 
250. While universalist-leaning states might attempt to create a regime specifically to fa- 
cilitate universalism, regime-building is no small undertaking. The upfront costs of negotiating 
and implementing such a regime might easily outweigh the present value of the anticipated 
benefits. More likely is the possibility that an existing regime for economic cooperation could 
be adapted to incorporate a goal of universalist cooperation. See Keohane, supra note 86, at 
100. “[R]egimes are easier to maintain than they are to create.” Id. 
251. See UNCITRAL Possible Future Work, supra note 26. 
252. See Harmer, supra note 26. 
253. See UNCITRAL Possible Future Work, supra note 26, at 7. 
254. See id. 
255. See Board Receives Report on Russian Program, supra note 26; Recovery from the 
Asian Crisis, supra note 26. 
256. U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law, Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency 
with Guide to Enactment, U.N. Sales No. E.99.V.3, United Nations Commission on Inter- 
national Trade Law, 30th Sess., at 3, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/442 (1997). The Model Law merely 
permits, but does not require, local courts in an adopting country to cooperate with foreign 
insolvency proceedings. Whether the Model Law is a positive development or not is subject to 
debate. Compare Westbrook, Global Solution, supra note 8, at 2279 (extolling Model Law), 
with Stephan, supra note 17, at 786 (“Rather than solving the coordination problem that exists 
under current law, the Model Law makes it worse.”). 
257. See Westbrook, Global Solution, supra note 8, at 2279. 
258. See Westbrook, Creating International Insolvency Law, supra note 59, at 564 (de- 
scribing project). 
259. See supra Part IV.B.1. 
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salist cooperation, the absence of universalism in the face of these insti- 
tutional efforts begs for explanation.260 The most recent institutional 
pronouncement on cross-border bankruptcy is the EU Insolvency Regu- 
lation, and it provides a useful case study for universalist regime 
possibilities.261 The EU may represent the best case for regime-based so- 
lutions, since the Union involves multiple overlapping commercial, 
political, and legal relationships among states, all devised to advance the 
EU’s multifaceted integrationist goals.262 With its dense web of institu- 
tions and a common commercial framework, the EU ought to be able to 
provide whatever norm elaboration, information dissemination, and link- 
ages that might be necessary to engender universalism.263 
However, as earlier discussed, universalism has not emerged in the 
EU. Instead, the EU Insolvency Regulation creates a hybrid system in 
which territoriality may potentially dominate.264 Historically, the vague- 
ness of the universalist commitment has been a serious impediment.265 In 
addition, states have been unwilling to abandon local priority rules. In 
early negotiations over an EU insolvency convention, it was “unthink- 
able” that states would “accept the subordination of the rights and 
expectations of local creditors”266 to the insolvency regime of another 
state. 
The theoretically elegant precepts of the scheme based upon 
[universalism] therefore yielded to the political imperatives of 






260. Granted, the reform projects of the development organizations focus primarily on 
bolstering the national bankruptcy laws of LDCs. 
261. Because the Regulation does not go into force until May 31, 2002, however, no ex- 
perience with the Regulation is available to inform our discussion. 
262. The major EU institutions are several. In addition to the European Court of Justice 
and the Court of First Instance, the EU has its own executive arm, the Commission; the Coun- 
cil, which functions roughly like a European Cabinet; the European Council, which consists of 
all EU heads of state; and the European Parliament, a quasi-legislative body. See John H. 
Jackson,  et al., International Economic  Relations  191  (3d  ed.  1995). 
263. As for numbers problems, the constellation of EU institutions should be as effective 
at reducing information costs as any set of international institutions that exist today. Even 
performing that function, however, no regime can guarantee that the required mutuality of 
interests among members will exist or that the shadow of the future is sufficiently strong. See 
supra Part IV.D. In any event, as the discussion in the text shows, even without numbers prob- 
lems, universalism within the EU seemed to suffer other impediments. 
264. See supra note 164 and accompanying text. 
265. See supra Part IV.B.1. 
266. Fletcher, supra note 157, at 254. 
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local practices in matters of the preferential treatment of certain 
types of claim in the process of distribution on an insolvency. 267 
Is some institutional solution available to facilitate universalism? 
Why have EU institutions been unsuccessful at overcoming obstacles to 
universalist cooperation? The EU case presents interesting questions for 
our proffered regime solution, since it offers both a prisoners’ dilemma 
cooperation problem—the vagueness of the home country standard—and 
a deadlock problem—states’ insistence on local priorities. 
Whether the problem of vague universalist commitments could be 
solved by resort to institutional mechanisms is unclear. Recall that the 
“home country” question involves more than straightforward norm 
elaboration. Clarification of the home country standard through institu- 
tional dispute resolution processes may simply encourage more eve-of- 
bankruptcy forum shopping,268 which itself may frustrate states’ expecta- 
tions ex post or discourage accession to universalism ex ante. So the cure 
may be no better than the disease. Perhaps extended norm elaboration 
could deter forum shopping by articulating what constitutes impermissi- 
ble manipulation. On the other hand, if the debtor actually relocates its 
center of main interests on the eve of bankruptcy in a blatant attempt at 
forum shopping,269 setting the appropriate remedy may be tricky. Nullify- 
ing the attempted forum shopping by simply ignoring the eve-of- 
bankruptcy relocation may not make sense going forward. Vesting home 
country jurisdiction in the national courts of a now-former home country 
would seem to complicate the conduct of the case, as the debtor’s center 




268. See supra note 142 and accompanying text. 
269. “Center of main interests” is the formulation of the home country standard in the 
Regulation. See EU Insolvency Regulation, supra note 157, art. 3(1). 
270. There may be other ways to deter forum shopping, for example, by assigning some 
sort of personal liability to corporate officers. This approach, however, might be unacceptable 
to some states. 
Forum shopping in U.S. bankruptcy has also been an issue. See LoPucki, supra note 189. 
However, resolution of that problem is much less critical than in the international context, 
since the applicable bankruptcy law is U.S. federal law, which does not vary from one U.S. 
state to another. See LoPucki, Cooperative Territoriality, supra note 24, at 2229. Under uni- 
versalism, of course, a forum shop changes the applicable bankruptcy law. 
271. Other possible indeterminacies relate to the interface of home country bankruptcy 
law with local nonbankruptcy law. The EU Insolvency Regulation attempts to address this 
with a detailed specification of the scope of the home country choice of law rule. See supra 
note 149, and accompanying text. In this area, an institutional mechanism for norm elabora- 
tion may be helpful for certain recurring issues. However, it is unclear in the context of large 
and far-flung multinational firms whether interface issues, inextricably tied to the peculiarities 
of local debtor-creditor laws, will recur or whether sui generis issues will predominate, in 
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Timing may also be an issue. Any regime-based norm elaboration 
process would have to accommodate the peculiar characteristics of bank- 
ruptcy proceedings. Their often time-sensitive nature may make 
impractical any attempt at international review of particular judicial or 
administrative decisions in national bankruptcy proceedings. Especially 
as to the crucial question of home country, review of a national court’s 
decision by the European Court of Justice may be difficult in light of the 
exigencies of the case.272 
What about EU states’ insistence on their local priorities? Such a 
stance, of course, produces a territorial system and precludes universal- 
ism. States’ refusal to “trade jurisdiction” across cases means that 
universalist cooperation is impossible.273 Perhaps resort to EU institu- 
tions could ameliorate this deadlock. Issue linkage is a possibility, as 
earlier discussed in the context of the pre-TRIPS deadlock. Given the 
density of commercial relations among EU states, it may be possible to 
incorporate other issues into the negotiations over universalism, such 
that objecting states might be granted offsetting concessions in other ar- 
eas. 
Issue linkage, however, is not a simple process. TRIPS was a special 
case involving an issue of exceptional significance to powerful interest 
groups within industrial countries. 
Getting intellectual property onto the MTN agenda was itself no 
easy task. Believing that European support would be necessary 
and Japanese support helpful in making it happen, the  U.S. 
Trade Representative recommended to the chairmen of Pfizer 
and IBM that they encourage their European and Japanese coun- 
terparts to pressure their governments and EC secretariat 
leadership to support the idea. Though competitors in global 
markets, these companies shared the common interest in im- 
proved intellectual property protection around the world, 
especially in developing-country markets, and various European 





which case indeterminacies will persist. Perhaps with a manageable number of states, norm 
elaboration could over time narrow the range of indeterminate interface issues. Time will tell 
whether the EU membership presents a manageable number. 
272. This would not preclude the possibility of ex post implementation review. See supra 
note 236 (discussing Trade Policy Review Mechanism and implementation review). 
273. See supra note 108, and accompanying text. 
274. Ryan, supra note 247, at 562 (footnote omitted). 
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Political interests associated with other potentially linked issues 
might object to any linkage with universalism for fear that it might doom 
their pet issues. With the TRIPS negotiations, for example, industrial 
country textile and agricultural interests were sacrificed in order to reach 
an IP deal with LDCs.275 International bankruptcy is unlikely to com- 
mand the same urgent attention and quality of domestic political support 
as international IP issues. Absent such attention and political support, the 
impetus to link universalism to some other prominent issue will be lack- 
ing. Moreover, it appears that historically within the EU, the most 
powerful states insisted on their local priorities.276 With the powerful 
states insisting on territorial prerogatives, it would be difficult for other 
states to effect any sort of trade across diverse issues.277 
In the end, the European experience should give us great pause. 
Even with the EU’s multifaceted formal institutions and commercial re- 
lationships, and its deep economic and political integration, universalist 
cooperation has not been forthcoming. Institutional norm elaboration 
probably cannot fix the fuzziness of the universalist commitment. In ad- 
dition, states continue to insist on their territorial prerogatives, which 
issue linkage is unlikely to solve. The available evidence suggests that 




Predicting the future is always a risky endeavor, and proving a nega- 
tive is impossible. However, my analysis shows many reasons to doubt 
that universalism provides a plausible prescription for international 
bankruptcy cooperation. Most states will likely remain territorial in their 
approach to cross-border insolvency. Even states with welfare maximiz- 
ing reasons to prefer mutual universalist cooperation will encounter 
tremendous difficulty attempting to establish and maintain universalist 
arrangements. Universalism presents them with a prisoners’ dilemma 
that is not easily resolved, either through the standard prescription of 
repeat play or more elaborate devices. 
The hopes of universalist advocates for a decentralized evolution to- 
ward universalism are particularly misplaced. The conditions of play in 
 
 
275. See supra note 247 and accompanying text. 
276. See Fletcher, supra note 157, at 254. 
277. It is unclear whether any of the EU states was willing to compromise on its local 
priorities. See id. If no states are willing to compromise on this issue, then even issue linkage 
will not help, because all states in effect prefer territoriality. 
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international bankruptcy render states unable to make credible commit- 
ments or enforce other states’ proffered commitments to universalism. 
Even if discount factors and payoff structures were conducive to the 
emergence of cooperation, fuzzy commitments and misperception prob- 
lems, the involvement of judges, and the problem of numbers would 
likely overwhelm any attempt at universalism. Even a state that prefers 
universalism faces the single-play prisoners’ dilemma, for which defec- 
tion is its dominant strategy. 
Regimes facilitate multilateral bargains that might not otherwise be 
possible. However, universalism has not emerged, despite the existence of 
several active regime-based international bankruptcy reform projects. Uni- 
versalists have failed to address this conspicuous absence of universalism 
or to describe a plausible route by which regime-based universalism might 
appear. Moreover, regimes cannot solve all universalist cooperation prob- 
lems. As the EU example shows, even strong institutions will not likely be 
able to remedy the indeterminacy in the universalist commitment or over- 
come entrenched territorial predispositions. 
Universalism is a sexy idea. Conceptually, it is neat and clean, sim- 
ple and sweet.278 In the face of inexorable globalization, the notion of a 
cooperative, internationalist, one-court, one-law bankruptcy system 
seems irresistible. In fact, however, states differ in their views of the ap- 
propriate goals and means for their bankruptcy regimes. Some states will 
refuse to cooperate. Others may be amenable, but conditions make sus- 
tained cooperation unlikely. Cooperation is hardly a given; it cannot be 
assumed. The universalist proposal seems deceptively straightforward, 
but only when much that is interesting, important, and difficult about 
international relations and international cooperation is assumed away. 
Scholars in other areas have embraced, rather than avoided, the 
thorny social and political questions raised by international legal and 
regulatory interaction. Bankruptcy scholars should do the same. Scholars 
and policymakers in many issue areas are discovering that the optimal 
blend of competition and cooperation across international borders must 
take account of local custom, culture, and history. Likewise, universal- 
ism must give way to more nuanced and more textured approaches. 
Territoriality will remain the dominant approach in international bank- 
ruptcy for the foreseeable future and maybe forever. Reform efforts 




278. “Universality is a very appealing approach. . . . It is intellectually elegant . . . .” 
Westbrook, Choice of Avoidance Law, supra note 8, at 515. 
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should shift accordingly, with territorially-based cooperation as the pri- 
mary focus. 
International bankruptcy is possible, but universalism probably is not. 
